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ABSTRACT 
 
Master’s thesis Belarus’s National Narratives and Representation of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania in Belarus’s History Textbooks in its theoretical framework excessively 
relies on the discussion of the existing approaches towards the study of nationalism such 
as the perennialist, the modernist/constructivist and the ethno-symbolist. The ethno-
symbolist approach by Anthony D. Smith, however, is chosen as the most appropriate 
for the empirical case of Belarus’s nation-building process and therefore, its ability to 
explain different expressions of Belarus’s national narratives is emphasized. 
The thesis combines the aforementioned theoretical framework with an empiri-
cal discussion of Belarus’s post-independence nation-building process in order to ex-
plain the peculiarity of the Belarus’s case in which the official national narrative coex-
ists with the alternative national narrative in Belarus’s public sphere. The research ques-
tion, however, is centered on the problem of the Belarus’s national narrative, as outlined 
in Belarus’s history textbooks, and its representation of Lithuania with regard to the 
medieval past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is shared by the both modern re-
publics of Belarus and Lithuania. 
With the analysis of history textbooks, the thesis responds to concerns of some 
Lithuanian historians and answers the question whether the Belarus’s national narrative 
and the representation of Lithuania presented in the textbooks are contesting and “re-
writing” the Lithuanian past in terms of their input in the creation and maintenance of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the mid-thirteenth century until the late eighteenth 
century. The aforementioned research provides an unprecedented analysis of Belarus’s 
history textbooks in regard to their representation of another national group during the 
particular period of the shared medieval past.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The time has come to distinguish what will become the unifying idea for all citizens of 
Belarus – from an academic to a peasant. Of course, the base of it is patriotism, readi-
ness to protect our heritage. These feelings are not transmitted on genetic level, but 
have to be molded through the interest to history, culture of our nation.”1 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, President of the Republic of Belarus, 
Speech during the special Presidential Award “For Spiritual revival” 
January 9, 2014 
 
On September 17, 2002 during an interview regarding Belarusian culture in the age of 
globalization, Alyaksandr Lukashenka asserted that it was necessary to adjust to the 
modern age by developing a national idea: “I would be happy if during my “presidential 
life” such an idea would be formulated.”2 He was doubtful, however, whether such an 
idea could be defined due to the overall discouraging condition of Belarusian society 
under which, according to Lukashenka, it could be “(…) very hard to come up with it.” 
 More than ten years later, on January 9, 2014 President Lukashenka presented a 
speech emphasizing, among other things, the necessity to “(…) distinguish what will 
become the unifying idea for all citizens of Belarus (…)”3 Even though it is too early to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s speech during the special Presidential Award “For Spiritual Revival, Minsk, 
January 9, 2014, President of the Republic of Belarus http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-
2 From the record of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Press Conference held on September 17, 2002, news 
agency www.tut.by. Стенограмма пресс-конференции Президента Республики Беларусь 
А.Г.Лукашенко 17 сентября 2002г. Available http://news.tut.by/society/18153.html 
3 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s speech during the special Presidential Award “For Spiritual Revival, Minsk, 
January 9, 2014, President of the Republic of Belarus http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-
lukashenko-prinjal-uchastie-v-tseremonii-vruchenija-premii-za-duxovnoe-vozrozhdenie-i-spetspremij-
7789/ 
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generalize about the outcome of this speech, it nevertheless marked either the inception 
of a new process or the climax of another. It is more than possible that the speech was a 
hint to the Belarusian cultural and political elite, as well as state officials, that Belarus 
needs a national idea or a unifying element for all people of Belarus “(…) from an aca-
demic to a peasant.”4 On the other hand, the speech might have marked the climax of 
the period initiated in 2002 in which Lukashenka mentioned the prospective develop-
ment of a national idea. 
 The first steps in formulating the national idea were taken already in 2003 when 
the Belarusian government accepted a policy document from the Ministry of Education 
“On Ideological Guidance of Educational Work” that called for a series of plans that 
reemphasized Belarus culture, history and the idea of patriotism. Several criteria were 
mentioned that had to be cultivated among pupils and students, such as a world view 
reflecting the ideals of Belarusian state and society, respect for national culture, respect 
for the traditions of other people and nationalities, as well as the development of key 
personal characteristics such as moral character, civic consciousness, patriotism, collec-
tivism and diligence.5 Thus, the Belarusian state on the official level ensured that such 
characteristics as patriotism, civic consciousness and dignity would be promoted 
through state education. It meant that the state’s ideological foundation would be ex-
pressed and promoted by the teaching staff and, more importantly, through official text-
books. 
In 2004, the “National Strategy of Stable Social-Economic Development of the 
Republic of Belarus until 2020” stated that “ideological work, introduced to national 
consciousness via education and enlightenment should transmit the ideas and principles 
of stable development to every citizen.”6 Later, on November 4, 2006 the Council of 
Ministers of the Republic of Belarus accepted the “General vectors of social-economic 
development of the Republic of Belarus for 2006-2015” where Article Three stated that 
the priorities of social-economic development included education, culture, healthcare, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s speech during the special Presidential Award “For Spiritual Revival, Minsk, 
January 9, 2014, President of the Republic of Belarus http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/aleksandr-
lukashenko-prinjal-uchastie-v-tseremonii-vruchenija-premii-za-duxovnoe-vozrozhdenie-i-spetspremij-
7789/ 
5 Приказ Министерства образования Республики Беларусь от 16.12.2003 N 497 “Об идеологиче-
ском сопровождении воспитательной работы”. 
6 Национальная комиссия по устойчивому развитию Республики Беларусь. Начиональная страте-
гия устойчивого социально-экономического развития Республики Беларусь на период до 2020 г. 
(Минск: Юкипак, 2004), p. 14. 
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housing, as well as branches formulating and improving the quality of human capital.7 
Abovementioned points that the Belarusian state exercises a common practice of nation-
states in which the educational system is used as a channel to introduce and transmit 
national values and ideas. Thus, the information presented in school textbooks should 
possess certain ideological values to nurture civic consciousness such as patriotism, 
vigor, etc. An analysis of Belarusian history textbooks, therefore, is the central part of 
this research. 
 In this study, the national idea is understood as a unifying national narrative on 
the development of “Belarusianness” throughout Belarusian history that would nurture 
the population’s national consciousness, patriotism, and sense of belonging to the mod-
ern Belarusian state. This process, however, represents a challenge to Belarus because 
the state’s official national narrative and understanding of its history are contested by 
various external actors, including non-governmental groups (NGOs) and the political 
opposition, which itself provides alternative interpretations of “Belarusianness.”8 Exist-
ing research on Belarusian nation-building tends to distinguish several models of Bela-
rusian nationalism, for example, Grigory Ioffe distinguishes three models – Nativist, 
pro-Russian and Creole.9 Even though researchers assign different names to such mod-
els, in general terms they are distinguished on the basis of official and alternative ap-
proaches to Belarusian nation-building process. 
 Nativist, European, Westernizer or the alternative approach to the Belarusian 
national narrative stand in opposition to pro-Russian, pro-Soviet and the official nation-
al narrative because they see the origins of Belarusian nationhood stemming from the 
medieval period, claiming that Belarusian nationhood developed during the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania. The pro-Russian narrative, on the other hand, claims that Soviet 
Belarus was the best among Belarusian nation-building projects and only under the So-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Pravo.by Национальный правовой интернет-портал Республики Беларусь, Постановление Совета 
Министров Республики Беларусь 4 ноября 2006 г. № 1475 
http://www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=C20601475&p2={NRPA} 
8 See, for example, Nicholas Vakar, Belorussia: The Making of A Nation (Cambridge: Harward Universi-
ty Press, 1956), Nelly Bekus, Struggle Over Identity. The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness” 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010). Available: http://books.openedition.org/ceup/581 
or Grigory Ioffe, "Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 8 (De-
cember, 2003). 
9 Grigory Ioffe, "Culture Wars, Soul-Searching, and Belarusian identity" East European Politics and So-
cieties, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2007). 
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viet rule could Belarus develop its unique nationhood.10 One of the distinctions between 
the two approaches is in their visions of the territorial borders of Belarus. Alternative 
narratives see Belarusian territory larger than it is nowadays due to the expense of his-
torical Belarusian lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
 The official national narrative of Belarus, as was mentioned above, is therefore 
presented in Belarusian history textbooks. The official narrative, however, does not 
necessarily present simply a pro-Russian model any longer since the process of Belarus-
ian nation-building has become more complicated after 2002 when President 
Lukashenka’s project of unification with Russia failed.11 It is necessary to mention that 
the official national narrative tries to promote a nation-building policy that would be 
broader and more complicated than a simple focus on the Soviet and Slavic origins of 
Belarus and Belarusians. The official narrative of Belarusian nationalism, as presented 
in history textbooks, has to maneuver between the pro-Russian and Nativist models to 
produce its own narrative, one that was described as “Creole” by Grigory Ioffe. 
In this study the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is extremely important 
because it is a period where inceptions of a Belarusian statehood can be seen. The ques-
tion is, however, how “Belarusianness” will be compared to its treatment of other re-
gional nationalities especially the Lithuanians, since both of them ruled the Grand 
Duchy. The Lithuanian case was chosen for this research and not, for example, the 
Polish one because Lithuania shares a common past with Belarus in an early common 
state that they ruled together before 1569. It provides a place for new interpretations of 
evidence and events that happened during that period which is considered a “glorious” 
time for Lithuania and “glorious” for Belarus in its alternative national narrative. It 
seems that starting in 2002 the question of national narrative and its importance in Bela-
rus nation-building started to be treated with new interpretations. Moreover, new inter-
pretations started to affect the shared past and Lithuanian national narrative itself. 
 A national idea should be based on national values, but these national values 
should be grounded in something that a country is proud of - its distinct historical past.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Andrew Savchenko, Belarus - A Perpetual Borderland (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 228. 
11 Andrew Wilson, Belarus: the Last Dictatorship in Europe (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 2011), 200. 
12 Yael Zerubavel, "The Historic, the Legendary, and the Incredible: Invented Tradition and Collective 
Memory in Israel" in Commemorations: the Politics of National Identity, edited by John Gillis, (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 107. 
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In many cases national history appears to be important for establishing certain narra-
tives that would develop patriotism and pride among the citizens of that country. In this 
regard, historical textbooks, as government publications, appear to be a reliable source 
in an attempt to find the foundations on which the state’s version of the national idea is 
based. 
 Distinct historical past, in the case of Belarus, refers to the times when Belarus-
ian lands were the part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and had directly contributed to 
the existence of the Duchy. In the thirteenth century the king of Lithuania Mindaugas 
(In Belarusian - Міндоўг) expanded his territory and acquired the lands that are parts of 
modern Belarus. This period is considered to be the creation of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania and was accomplished through voluntary arrangements between Lithuanians 
and Belarusians such as marriages, trade and centuries-long cohabitation.13 This period, 
however, appears to be contested by some scholars since this period is targeted for na-
tion-building purposes in Lithuania as well as in Belarus. 
 In September 2013 Professor Valdas Rakutis from the General Jonas Žemaitis 
Lithuanian Military Academy expressed a concern that: 
For thirty years now starting from school, most Belarusians are taught that 
Mindaugas, Gediminas and all the others were Belarus leaders and that the 
country was Belarus. And that the Samogitians are some vague bunch of 
people living in the west and who are somehow different but their signifi-
cance in this country isn’t expressly indicated. And all that happened here 
happened with the hard work of the Litvinians - as they call themselves - 
Belarusians.14 
According to Rakutis, this clearly indicates that Belarusian textbooks and the emerging 
Belarusian national narrative challenged the Lithuanian national narrative since Belarus-
ians seem to downplay Lithuanian historical importance in the establishment of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania as well as in their shared past. Thus, certain concerns exists 
that Belarusian history textbooks “rewrite” the Lithuanian past. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads of History (Westview Press, 1993), 19. 
14 The Lithuanian Tribune, News and Views from Lithuania, “Belarusian rewriting history – do you think 
you’re the Lithuanians?” September 27, 2013, available: 
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/52087/belarusians-rewriting-history-do-you-think-youre-the-
lithuanians-201352087/ 
11 
	  
 The theoretical framework of the research is based on the discussion of national-
ism studies and the work of its leading proponents. For this research, the role of educa-
tion in nation-building process is vital and will be discussed as part of the nationalism 
framework. The models developed by Andy Green and Abigail Green on the role of ed-
ucation in nation-building process are discussed in particular in this research. 
The initial aim of this research is to understand the Belarusian nation-building 
process in order to place the research of Belarusian history textbooks in a broader con-
text. This research looks at mainly seventh and eighth grade history textbooks to ana-
lyse the representation of Lithuanians and Belarusians in the narratives presented in 
Belarusian history textbooks. This choice of textbooks is based on the existing research 
of a Belarusian scholar who analysed Belarusian history textbooks from the 1990s to 
2009 in order to examine their representation of the historical past. Tatyana Ostrovskaya 
(Татьяна Островская) concluded that textbooks of fifth and sixth grades, as well as 
tenth and eleventh grades do not focus on the topic of the formation of Belarusian na-
tionhood.15 Furthermore, one sixth-grade textbook was reviewed by the author of this 
thesis and concluded that at this point the periodization of the textbook does not include 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, while textbooks designed for the tenth and eleventh 
grades focus primarily on modern history. 
 After reaching conclusions on the representation of Belarusian and Lithuanian 
national roles in Belarusian history textbooks, it will be possible to uncover how the 
construction of the Belarusian national narrative changes Belarusian political role in the 
region and more precisely its historical ties to the Republic of Lithuania. Moreover, how 
does the Belarusian national narrative as developed in history textbooks challenges the 
Lithuanian historical narrative? 
The research represents a social science approach to modern nationalism and to 
the construction of national histories. Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulat-
ed:  
H1: The Belarusian national narrative in history textbooks does not challenge 
the Lithuanian national narrative, but seeks to highlight and empower the “Belarusian-
ness” of their shared past for the nation-building purposes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Татьяна Островская, Генеология Исторической Памяти Белорусов в Контексте 
Образовательных Практик (Genealogy of Historical Memory of Belarusian in Context of Education 
Practices) Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, SA #1/2010RU, (October 20, 2010), 33. 
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H2: The more the official Belarusian narrative tries to establish a Belarusian na-
tional idea, the more it resembles the alternative narrative of Belarusian opposition. 
 The value of an empirical study of Belarusian-Lithuanian representation in Bela-
rusian history textbooks is that it is able to produce relevant evidence for the under-
standing of the Belarusian national narrative and nation-building process in general. In 
addition, it produces greater understanding of practical applications of the theoretical 
framework of nationalism. Furthermore, responding to concerns of some Lithuanian 
scholars, the study addresses a concrete problem whether the Belarusian national narra-
tive tries to “rewrite” the Lithuanian past. 
Chapter One presents broader theoretical framework for the research based on 
the discussion of nationalism theory and the ethno-symbolist approach of Anthony D. 
Smith in particular. Chapter Two provides an empirical analysis of different expressions 
of the Belarusian national narrative as well as their essence as presented in official and 
alternative discourses. Chapter Three presents the empirical analysis of Belarusian his-
tory textbooks with regard to the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily fo-
cusing on expressions of the Belarusian and the Lithuanian presence in the textbooks. 
This analysis also relies on existing research of Belarusian history textbooks, which are 
relevant for the purposes of periodization and support of certain arguments. 
The research methodology of the study lies in the interpretive approaches to nar-
rative analysis. Since the role of Lithuania and Lithuanians is not the primary focus of 
Belarusian history textbooks, particular attention is paid to their every mention in the 
textbooks. Furthermore, history textbook analysis is supplemented by an analysis of the 
political discourse of the Belarusian national narrative, among supporters of the official 
national narrative of Belarus as well as among supporters of the alternative national nar-
ratives. Moreover, the study focuses on symbols of Belarusian collective identity that 
are visible in the public sphere and which facilitate creation of collective memory 
among Belarusians. Such symbols are movies, music, monuments, language politics, 
reenactment groups, etc. 
 Studies that are concerned with analysis of history textbooks might face similar 
challenges due to the peculiar relationship between the government and history textbook 
publishing and distribution. In the case of Belarusian textbooks it was problematic to 
acquire older textbooks, which would expand the scope of this study. In this regard, this 
13 
	  
study is forced to focus on the limited number of the most recent history textbooks as 
well as on the existing analysis of previous Belarusian history textbooks conducted by 
other scholars. The author understands the challenge of possible bias that might be con-
nected with this previous research; however, I attempt to use relevant observations from 
this work as objectively as possible. Therefore, the analysis of history textbooks is sup-
plemented with the analysis of various speeches and political statements, as well as, 
analysis of existing symbols that would emphasize one or another form of “Belarusian-
ness” in the Belarusian public sphere. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter starts with the discussion of some central concepts that are used in this re-
search such as historical and national narratives in order to clarify their meaning as they 
are used in the research. 
 Hayden White in his work The Historical Text as Literary Artifact provides a 
broader understanding of a historian’s work and the meaning of historical narrative as 
an outcome of a historian’s work. White argues that “historical narratives (…) are ver-
bal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented as found and the forms of which 
have more in common with their counterparts in literature than they have with those in 
the sciences.”16 Earlier, Robin Collingwood claimed that historians, by interpreting the 
evidence, are inventing historical narratives where a historian’s constructive and histori-
cal imagination was necessary.17 Moreover, this imagination is structural rather than 
ornamental which points to the importance of imagination in constructing a structure of 
historical narratives. In fact, history only reveals itself through the production of specif-
ic narratives where “historical imagination” is used in the very process of production.18 
Another usage of “historical imagination” is that it enables historians to establish 
connections between items of evidence.19 Furthermore, without the historical imagina-
tion “the historian would have no narrative to adorn.”20 Since historians are using “raw” 
sources, i.e. data, documents and texts, it is necessary to interpret them by choosing a 
certain type of story as well as methodology in order to structure the events and pro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hayden White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact” Tropics of Discourse (1978): 82. 
17 Robin Collingwood, The Idea of History, edited by Jan Van der Dussen (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 9-10. 
18 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1995), 25. 
19 Marine Hughes-Warrington, “How Good an Historian Shall I Be?” R.G. Collingwood, the Historical 
Imagination and Education, British Idealist Studies Series 2: Collingwood, Volume 2 (Bedfordshire: An-
drews UK, 2003): 170. 
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cesses that occurred in history.21 Furthermore, Hayden White concludes that we can on-
ly know the actual (history) by contrasting it with or likening it to the imaginable (fic-
tion).22 All of the aforementioned supports the idea that there can be several national 
narratives that are dependent on the interpretation of the sets of events and processes 
that occurred in the past because the historical problem or narrative is settled in the past 
only until someone else decides to reopen it.23 
 Eventually, narrative construction or story-telling is the most important function 
of writing history.24 Therefore, several types of narratives might be distinguished. Ac-
cording to Allan Megill’s categorization, a micro-narrative focuses on a particular event 
from the past; a master narrative seeks to explain a broader segment of history like a 
particular period; a grand narrative “is an account that purports to be the authoritative 
account of history in general”25; and a metanarrative draws upon a particular cosmology 
or metaphysical foundation such as Christianity.26 The history of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, as a part of Belarusian history, can be considered a master narrative since it is 
a broader segment or period of history. This period to a certain extent is also used in the 
nation-building discourse in Belarus since it is an example of the glorious past where 
inceptions of “Belarusianness” can be claimed. Moreover, the official and the alterna-
tive national narratives in Belarus use this past but with different interpretations. In this 
case, the national narrative that can also be named the grand narrative within my re-
search, consists of different events and processes from the past that are supposed to 
have national importance for the creation of an independent Belarusian nation and Bela-
rusian consciousness among the people. Official and alternative discourses on the incep-
tions of Belarusian consciousness and statehood differ in various significant points that 
will be analyzed in this research. 
 In broader discussions of nation and nationalism, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the two larger schools of thinking - the modernist or the constructivist that sees 
the nation as a modern construct - and the perennialist school, which sees the nation as 
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an ancient entity that naturally developed through the time and space. Despite the exist-
ence of large amount of classical and philosophical literature on nationalism, one of the 
paradoxes of the international discussion about nation and nationalism is the failure to 
produce a uniform and generally accepted terminology of these concepts.27 In this re-
gard the concepts of nation and nationalism have to be discussed separately and accord-
ing to each school of thought. 
The modernist school of thought represents the dominant orthodoxy in national-
ism studies and therefore, the modernity of nations is sometimes assumed unintentional-
ly. The representative of the modernist school of thinking, Benedict Anderson, under-
stands the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherent-
ly limited and sovereign.”28 According to Anderson, the nation is constructed and does 
not really have ethnic or historical roots that would define its present conditions. The 
perennialist school of thought, on the other hand, defines another perspective according 
to which nations have existed from time immemorial and therefore cannot be defined by 
the age of modernity. Even though the perennialist school recognizes that nationalist 
ideology is a contemporary phenomenon, it mainly stresses the idea of social evolution, 
gradualism, progress and social and cultural cumulation.29  One of the most important 
distinctions in the case of both schools is the formulation of “national ontology” – a 
question – whether a nation is an existing phenomenon in social reality or is an “imag-
ined” or constructed phenomenon.30 
 Starting with the nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the perenni-
alist approach had been largely accepted by scholars, however, after the Second World 
War when the connection between such concepts as “race” and “nation” started to be 
questioned, its overall acceptability decreased. Perennialism tries to see historical conti-
nuity in the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. In fact, the approach itself is 
more about ethnicity and ethnic identity rather than nationalism and nations in particu-
lar. Ethnic groups for perennialism are strictly historical and social, rather than natu-
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ral.31 Therefore, this approach should not be confused with the naturalist conception of 
the nation that is the basis for the “primordialist” approach.32 An important idea is that 
the perennialist approach refuses to see ethnic communities as given in nature, but ra-
ther as human and social phenomenon that have existed throughout history and eventu-
ally made them immemorial to the members of those communities. This approach, 
however, emphasizes the linear development of a nation that is always undergoing a 
process of gradual development keeping the ethnic constituent of a nation largely intact. 
 According to this school of thought, ethnicity can be regarded as a “tangible” 
reality that links human beings from generation to generation.33 First and foremost, the 
biological component of ethnicity makes it “tangible,” however; the approach goes be-
yond simple biological connection between the people. Therefore, ethnicity is not some-
thing that is engraved in a rock on biological level and therefore cannot be changed. In 
fact, the very idea of the ethnicity is to be preserved throughout the process of its histor-
ical change. Abovementioned makes it clear that nation, according to the perennialist 
school of thought, is a historical and social phenomenon that developed throughout his-
tory due to close interrelation of people within certain ethnic communities. Within this 
approach, the modernity of nations is rejected, but the modernity of nationalism as a po-
litical movement is recognized.  Nevertheless, nation is considered a genuine historical 
product of social coexistence of particular ethnic communities rather than a product of 
the modern age. 
 With the stress on historical past of ethnic communities, the question arises 
whether this approach can be applicable to the Belarusian nation whose past appears to 
be contested by several national narratives that disagree on the ethnic component of the 
Belarusian nation. In general, this approach devotes less attention explaining the con-
cept of civic as well as cultural identity of a nation in comparison to its ethnic compo-
nents. The idea of a civic nation, however, seems applicable to the present state of the 
official Belarus’s nation-building process in which Belarusian ethnicity and its histori-
cal transformations are emphasized less than the idea of people’s belonging to the mod-
ern Belarusian state. Furthermore, the perennialist approach fails to see the important 
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difference between the pre-modern and modern ethnic communities as well as, over-
looks the importance of cultural components and complexity if human association.34 In 
this regard, it is questionable whether the perennialist approach is able to theoretically 
contribute to the discussion on Belarusian and therefore, the modernist approach should 
be overviewed. 
 One of the most prominent representatives of the modernist school of thought is 
Benedict Anderson who understands nationalism as the concept associated with “kin-
ship” and “religion,” rather than with more ideological narratives as “liberalism” or 
“fascism.”35 He sees nationalism as a cultural artifact of a particular kind, which is ca-
pable of being transplanted to a variety of social terrains, and merged with political and 
ideological constellations. Thus, nationalism is not an ideology but rather an imagined 
collective consciousness that exists within a society or a group of people who think 
about themselves as related to one another.36 This is why concepts of “kinship” and “re-
ligion” contribute as comparisons to nationalism since they also prescribe certain imag-
ined criteria or cultural systems to be associated with other people of their kind, i.e. Or-
thodox, Muslims etc. 
 Anderson claims that the nation is “(…) an imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”37 The nation becomes imagined be-
cause people of a particular society or community will never know each other personal-
ly; therefore, they are compelled to imagine their sameness and collectivity. Later, this 
imagined sameness gives way to a political community whose goal is a separate nation 
of the people of their kind. The imagined sameness, however, is limited because it 
stretches only to the boundaries where another nation is imagined in a similar way.38 
 According to Anderson, awareness of national identity is facilitated by “print-
capitalism” - the production of books in a certain language or vernacular that would 
point to the existence of other members of particular linguistic group. More precisely, 
“(…) print-capitalism made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think 
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about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in a profoundly new way.”39 
Through these steps of self-imagining a nation and thus a state can be invented. 
Another modernist, Ernest Gellner claims: “Nations are not inscribed into the 
nature of things (…). Nor were the national states the manifest ultimate destiny of eth-
nic or cultural groups.”40 According to Gellner, nations did not develop through the 
times with certain ethnic backgrounds as the perennialist school claims. Therefore, na-
tions did not really exist since cultural groups existed that would overlap and intertwine 
and sometimes have certain political units of all shapes and sizes.41 What is important in 
Gellner’s approach, however, is the assumption that nationalism in such cultural groups 
engenders nations and not vice versa.42 
 Gellner does not contradict the assumption that cultural groups existed through-
out history; however, he believes that “nation can be defined only in terms of the age of 
nationalism.”43 Therefore, culture has always existed among groups of people, but the 
only difference is that they were not able to unite in a nation because they did not have 
particular knowledge or necessity to do so. Accordingly, when the realization of same-
ness came in the age of nationalism - facilitated by external factors like print-capitalism 
- it was possible to develop nationalism, which facilitated the establishment of nations. 
In this regard, national sameness is not the product of ethnicity or cultural development 
but rather the product of fusion of will, culture, and polity in particular point of time,44 
which allowed inventing a nation similarly to traditions that also can be invented to 
support certain narratives. 
 Not only nation can be invented, however, but also various traditions that would 
emphasize particular nation’s historical continuity with modern political formations. 
Eric Hobsbawm in his work Inventing Traditions claims that traditions, which claim to 
be old are recent in origin are sometimes invented.45 Foremost it is done to support the 
idea of historical continuity with a certain greater past that would legitimize communi-
ty’s presence in a particular time and space. In line with this idea Ernest Renan claimed: 
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“To have common glories in the past and to have common will in the present; to have 
performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the essential 
conditions for being a people.”46 This points to the reason why some traditions want to 
be established on the ground of some heroic or glory past. It is not always the case, 
however, that traditions would be established with the sole goal to emphasize and sup-
port the heroic past. Eric Hobsbawm shows that in fact traditions – similarly to nations 
– can be invented on the expense of older or even other traditions.47 Therefore, 
Hobsbawm’s Invented Traditions are closely related to Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities since they both support the idea that certain practices can be invented and 
recognized. 
Sometimes, however, Hobsbawm’s arguments do not seem persuasive when he 
argues about the existence of some genuine traditions where new traditions cannot be 
revived or invented.48 In this case, the problem lies in the definition of genuine tradi-
tions and the understanding of what can make one tradition protected from being re-
invented. It seems, however, that overall public and cultural acceptance of a tradition as 
a repetitive symbolic practice among the society members can protect it from coming 
into oblivion or being re-invented in the future. In terms of governmentally mediated 
representations or practices such as commemorations or national symbols, their public 
acceptance may be achieved easier, especially in states with weaker civic consciousness 
and political culture. Therefore, according to Hobsbawm, “invention” of traditions 
would occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or de-
stroys the social patterns for which “old” traditions had been designed.49 On the exam-
ple of Belarus, such rapid social transformations occurred after the breakup of the Sovi-
et system when new independent symbols of Belarus were produced. 
 The modernist school of thought appears to be successful in its explanatory 
power with regard to particular period of Belarus’s post-1991 nation-building process. 
This school of thought, however, fails to explain the sentiments of the alternative na-
tional narrative. Indeed, Belarusian linguistic and cultural identity in the sixteenth cen-
tury partly developed due to the work of Belarusian humanist Francysk Skaryna 
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(Францыск Скарына) who in 1517 published a translation of the Bible in a Belarusian 
version of Church Slavonic.50 Besides that, with the spread of print-capitalism and the 
works of Francišak Bahuševič (Францішак Багушэвіч) in 1891, his fellow countrymen 
were able to recognize that they all were Belarusians and that their land’s name was 
Belarus.51 The question, however, is whether the process of spreading of the Belarusian 
language was successful in promotion of Belarusian political nationalism among the 
local peasants who in the sixteenth century neither thought in terms of larger political 
nations, nor were literate to extent to be able to imagine their sameness through texts in 
the Belarusian language. 
 Therefore, this approach is unable to satisfy the incentives of the alternative na-
tional narrative that is visible in the Belarusian political and public sphere simply be-
cause it does not recognize deep historical and ethnic roots of the Belarusian nation. 
Thus, the theoretical discussion on the perennialist and the modernist school of thoughts 
outlined their applicability to different expressions of Belarusian national narrative, but 
failed to recognize the complexity and controversy of the process in general. Mainly, 
neither of the approaches was able to explain the ideas behind both the official and the 
alternative national narratives. Therefore, in search of the theory capable to satisfy both 
narratives, this research moves to the approach outlined by Anthony Smith who is con-
sidered to represent the ethno-symbolist school of thought. 
 
Ethno-Symbolism and Belarusian National Narratives 
	  
If perennialism focuses on ethnic descent of the nations, but modernism on the imag-
ined and invented construction of the nations, the ethno-symbolic approach tries to see 
people’s symbolic connection throughout history that would allow them to be called a 
nation. This approach looks at the cultural features of particular communities in its in-
tentions to see people’s historical interconnection. Therefore, such variables as the role 
of myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols are in focus of this approach.52 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Timothy Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 19. 
51 Grigory Ioffe, "Understanding Belarus: Belarusian Identity" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 8 (De-
cember, 2003): 1247. 
52 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism…, 190. 
22 
	  
 In general, this approach tries to see the broader and more complicated picture of 
the development of nations. It tries to distance the historical nation-building process as 
being solely elite-oriented and therefore, stresses the importance of complicated rela-
tionship between the elite and lower strata of social system in which the common peo-
ple also influence the elite through their cultural traditions, vernacular mobilization 
etc.53 Another important feature of the ethno-symbolic school of thought is that it tries 
to analyze social and cultural patterns over la longue durée, i.e. over the long period of 
time, the term used in the Annales School of French historiography. By placing the fo-
cus on the broader periodization, the approach tries to see the possible influence of early 
collective cultural identities on the inceptions of a particular modern nation. 
 The form of collective cultural identity within this approach is referred to the 
concept of ethnie (French - ethnic community), which is smaller than the nation and al-
lows several ethnies to coexist and interconnect within particular territory. In general, 
ethnie means a unit of population with common ancestry myths and historical memo-
ries, elements of shared culture, link with historic territory and some measure of solidar-
ity.54 The relationship of nations to ethnies, however, is rather complicated and there-
fore cannot be explained by the simple linear progression of their historical interconnec-
tion.55 Furthermore, even though the ethno-symbolic approach primarily focuses on cul-
tural features of ethnies such as myths and symbols, it does not fully disregard the eth-
nic constituency of nations in their historical development. 
Anthony Smith, as a representative of the ethno-symbolist approach, argues that 
ethnicity, like history is crucial to an adequate understanding of nationalism.56 He 
claims that ethnic community resembles an extended family that extends over time and 
space to include many generations and many districts in a specific territory.57 Further-
more, ethnic continuity and the ethnic past rediscover certain vital memories, values, 
symbols and myths, without which nationalism would be powerless.58 
 Anthony Smith stresses the importance of ethnic symbols that unite national 
communities. Therefore, the ethno-symbolic understanding of nation implies that small-
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er units of population that belong to this nation have some degree of shared past and 
memory together with a degree of common myths and culture. According to Smith, 
abovementioned ethnies have had very deep historical roots even before the rise of na-
tionalism. Therefore, in line with this approach, there is a reason to suggest that the Bel-
arusian nation also has some historical ethnies that have existed on its territory during 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
Even though the ethnic constituent of nations is recognized under this approach, 
ethnies themselves are constituted not by lines of physical descent, but by the sense of 
continuity, shared memory and collective destiny, i.e. by lines of cultural affinity em-
bodied in distinctive myths, memories, symbols and values retained by a given unit of 
population.59 Therefore, there has to be an understanding of shared past and culture 
among the members of particular community rather than the biological and ethnic link. 
Thus, the ethno-symbolic approach is able to explain the nation-building patterns of the 
official national narrative, which is not focusing on lines of physical descent from the 
people of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but rather on their symbolic relation to the 
modern state of Belarus. Furthermore, the official national narrative is stressing cultural 
and symbolic importance of the Soviet period and culture in making of the modern Bel-
arusian identity. 
 Therefore, the official national narrative, by recognizing the influence of the 
medieval period on the Belarusian lands supports the argument of the ethno-symbolist 
that ethnie and the ethnic constituent of a nation does not have to be physically connect-
ed to a nation’s ancestors. Even though the official Belarusian narrative does not physi-
cally connect itself and the Belarusian nation with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it par-
tially recognizes the non-physical influence the period had on Belarus’s history and on 
the modern Belarusian state. 
Ethnie is a product of dialogue between social groups and institutions in which 
each generation has to refashion national institutions in the light of myths, memories 
and culture of the past.60 It means that for the ethno-symbolist school of thinking the 
idea of a connection with the past is important, however, the nation has to renew and 
retell the myths in order to maintain itself and national consciousness. It, furthermore, 
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means that nation is an objective social reality rather than continuously constructed 
phenomenon as in the modernists’ case. 
Both the official and the alternative national narrative in Belarus center their vi-
sion of Belarus on the Belarusian history. The main difference, however, is that they 
focus on different historical periods and values to shape their arguments in regard to the 
nation-building process of modern Belarus. The abovementioned overview of the ethno-
symbolist approach shows that it can be applicable both to the official and the alterna-
tive national narrative. National narratives, however, emphasize different sets of sym-
bols that they offer to the modern Belarusian nation. If the official national narrative 
relies on the myths and symbols of the Soviet period at the same time disregarding the 
pre-Soviet and the pre-Imperial past, the alternative national narrative focuses on histor-
ical connection of Belarusian ethnie to the modern Belarusian nation disregarding the 
Soviet-era symbols and their influence on modern Belarus. In terms of the ethno-
symbolist approach, the official national narrative rejects the ethno-cultural influence of 
the Belarus’s pre-Soviet and pre-Imperial past, but the alternative narrative, on the other 
hand, tends to recognize its cultural, social and ethnic continuation with the modern 
Belarusian state. 
For the alternative national narrative, the pre-Soviet and the pre-Imperial sym-
bols such as emblems of the Grand Duchy, reenactment festivals, pre-Soviet architec-
ture and other, serve as powerful reminders of their unique culture and ethnic communi-
ty that existed on Belarusian lands from the thirteenth century to the late nineteenth cen-
tury. For the official national narrative, on the other hand, the line of ethic descent is not 
as important as the role of the Soviet-era symbols and values such as, stability, conserv-
atism, etc. 
Therefore, the ethno-symbolic approach to the study of nationalism is best ap-
plicable for the empirical part of my research in which I analyze the representations of 
the official and the alternative national narrative in Belarus’s public sphere. The afore-
mentioned approach is able to exactly explain why various Belarus’s national narratives 
tend to focus on different milestones of Belarusian history. This approach is also select-
ed because the perennialist and the modernist approaches fail to comprehend the com-
plexity of Belarusian nation-building process in which Belarusian political and cultural 
nationalism developed relatively later than in other post-Soviet countries such as the 
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Baltic States. More precisely, the perennialist approach fails to explain why the Bela-
rus’s official national narrative does not use the glorious Belarusian past in its nation-
building choices and mainly relies on the Soviet-era past of Belarus. The modernist ap-
proach, on the other hand, fails to explain why the Belarus’s alternative national narra-
tive rejects the Soviet-era past since it is the modern and also glorious past that can be 
used in the nation-building discourse. 
Anthony Smith’s approach towards the nations and nationalism seems to the 
best in explaining the complicated relationship between the distinct and historical Bela-
rusian culture, and its use in the Belarusian public sphere for the nation-building pro-
cess. The nation-building process itself, however, does not simply rely on one or anoth-
er national narrative, but rather on sets of practices and policies that develop people’s 
sense of community and national values that connect people within a particular territory. 
In this case, states’ educational systems have a significant impact on formulating peo-
ple’s perspective and relationship towards the state and its past. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to overview the specific relationship between the education and its role in the na-
tion-building process. 
	  
The Role of Education in Nation-Building Process 
 
In this sub-chapter the role of education in nation-building process is analyzed based on 
the examples of Andy Green’s analysis of the relationship between education, globali-
zation and state formation, and Abigail Green’s empirical case study in the book Fa-
therlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Andy Green 
and Abigail Green provide different models that demonstrate the role of state in nation-
building via education. Abigail Green’s nineteenth-century model puts emphasis on the 
nation as a unifying concept but Andy Green’s twentieth century model discusses inter-
nationalization of education due to globalization and the close geographical proximity 
of regional actors. Both models are visible in the Belarusian nation-building process at 
present. 
 In the book Education, Globalization and the Nation State Andy Green claimed 
that in a post-national and globalized world the relationship between education and na-
tion-building has changed since the governments can no longer use education to pro-
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mote social cohesion as they did in the past.61 Despite the fact that education systems 
remain national institutions under national control, Andy Green claims that modern 
states seek to promote more inclusive forms of national identity that respond to the ne-
cessity of multinational states to recognize the effects of coexistence with other regional 
ethnicities.62 These ideas go in line with Anthony Smith’s thoughts that there is no one 
“genuine” version of nationalism, as accepted by such a modernist scholar as Ernest 
Gellner, meaning that education system’s primary goal is not to homogenize the popula-
tion but to unite it around particular common denominators.63 Therefore, the mass edu-
cation system should recognize the plurality of a state and to unify the population 
around their certain shared values, myths, memories, etc. 
Andy Green introduces a concept of civic-based rather than ethnic-based nation 
in which ethnic connections are weaker and less emphasized in comparison to people’s 
civic identity within a particular state. According to Green: “[national education] tried 
to create the civic identity and national consciousness which would bind each to the 
state and reconcile each to the other, making actual citizens (…).64 Moreover, education 
as a process of state formation appears to be the primary function of early periods of 
nation-building, or of periods of political reconstruction after crises.65 
 European powers controlled central or local educational institutions through the 
allocation of funds, inspecting schools, certification of teachers and other measures.66 
Furthermore, education also became a feature of social organization that would establish 
an imagined unity of people through linking the present with a nation’s particular past. 
French sociologist Emile Durkheim thought that education acted as a vehicle of social 
integration through the transmission of culture.67 Moreover, it had to be a unifying, 
state-promoted culture. In this regard, public education through schools was necessary 
because previous networks of voluntary schools proved incapable of providing univer-
sal education without state assistance.68 The basic forms of public systems were first 
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established in 1830s in the German states, France, Holland and Switzerland. In Belarus, 
despite the fact that Belarusian schools existed prior to 1991, central, and more im-
portantly – a Belarusian rather than Soviet authority able to exercise nation-building 
policies through education – appeared only following its independence after 1991. 
 Abigail Green, in Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth 
Century Germany, discussed another example of how education could be used in na-
tion-building. The nineteenth century German Mittelstaaten (Hanover, Saxony and 
Württemberg) serves as an example of the successful use of education in the state and 
nation-building process. After the revolution of 1848 and, more importantly, after the 
unification of the German states in 1871, education and school books in Germany were 
used in order to promote certain national sentiments since the unity of German states 
had to be imagined due to lack of common national denominators, especially in the re-
gions subordinated to Prussia and Austria, and due to previously existing antagonisms 
between the states. Green claims that the example of German nation-state formation 
shows the success of state structures that were able to overcome existing “cultural na-
tion” sentiments of pre-modern societies.69 Among the national state structures was also 
the system of education and textbooks in particular. More precisely: “(…) school books 
usually presented Germany as the primary frame of reference for studying and under-
standing the particular Fatherland and its past.”70 
 An understanding of Fatherland in the three states would be promoted through 
poems included in the school curriculum, through the history of a particular state or by 
stressing the role of past monarchs in shaping German national developments.71 Some-
times textbooks would address similar themes presented by different authors from dif-
ferent states to point out similarities and some common narratives that existed between 
formerly independent German states. Overall, authors of school textbooks were more 
interested in interpreting past processes and events from the view of national German 
affairs in the late nineteenth century. There would also be different narratives in text-
books of different German lands. For example, Württemberg textbooks would empha-
size Württemberg’s cultural and scholarly achievements that bore resemblance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Abigail Green, Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth Century Germany (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6-7. 
70 Green, Fatherlands…, 269. 
71 Green, Fatherlands…, 269. 
28 
	  
other lands. But Hanoverian schoolbooks would pay little attention to culture and focus 
on the political history of the state.72  Therefore, in broader terms, German mass educa-
tion promoted German values and symbols on the national level in order to replace the 
regional sentiments that existed in the German lands before the unification of Germany. 
 First and foremost, Abigail Green’s analysis shows that German nationalism had 
to be reconfigured after the unification in 1871 based on new national values and sym-
bols by the means of state structures in order to pursue a goal of not only political but 
also national German consolidation. Green’s research shows that nationalism had to be 
promoted within the state among the people in order to establish loyalty and help them 
reconfigure their sense of communality among themselves. 
A crucial significance of history textbooks is located in their ability to present 
and interpret a distinct and remote past that was previously unknown to the audience. 
Therefore, besides collective consciousness, collective memory is also facilitated by the 
system of state education since history textbooks cover period where personal memory 
is no longer alive and therefore, people’s relation to that past has to be directed and me-
diated by the system of education. Furthermore, as far as state nation-building policies 
are concerned, a specific type of collective memory might be distinguished – political 
memory. 
 
Political Memory as a Part of Collective Memory 
 
Learning on national level is usually conducted through state institutions and services 
such as the system of mass education. In comparison to individuals, institutions do not 
possess a memory, they rather “make” it for themselves around such memorial signs 
such as texts, images, monuments, ceremonies etc.73 Such institutional memory appears 
to be facilitated and constructed by the state institutions, and is based on exclusion, se-
lection and separation of the useful from the not useful, and the relevant from the irrele-
vant. Moreover, a collective memory, in this respect, is a mediated memory that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Green, Fatherlands…, 283. 
73 Aleida Assmann, “Transformations Between history and Memory” Social Research, Vol. 75. No. 1 
Collective Memory and Collective Identity (Spring 2008): 55. 
29 
	  
backed by material media, symbols and practices, which have to be placed into the 
hearts and minds of people.74 
Such a type of institutionally produced collective memory can be called a politi-
cal memory and is produced by the official state institutions in the process of mediating 
memory by symbols, commemorations, monuments, history textbooks, etc. Therefore, 
collective memory in this research appears as a larger framework in more local discus-
sion on political type of collective memory. Keeping in mind that it is never the past 
itself but rather the representation of past events that acts within a society, it is highly 
possible that such representation might be altered with the help of a different interpreta-
tion of particular events. Precisely this process is seen when several national narratives 
are developed to produce a single process like, for example, nation-building. 
 In her work Transformation Between History and Memory, Aleida Assmann 
claims that collective memory is in fact an umbrella term that unites several forms of 
memory such as family memory, interactive group memory, social, political, national 
and cultural memory.75 For the research on Belarusian official and alternative narra-
tives, as well as on Belarusian history textbooks, the format of political memory appears 
to be the most suitable since it looks at the rationale behind the will of state institutions 
to facilitate a certain type of collective memory for the nation-building purposes. 
 Political memory is based on the long-term carriers of external symbols and rep-
resentations and thus can be transmitted from one generation to another. Despite the fact 
that the state cannot influence the personal memories of its citizens in a direct way,76 
indirectly it is able to shape and mediate collective memory in various ways, such as 
through the emplotment of events in a charged and mobilizing narrative, visual and ver-
bal signs, institutions of learning and mass media, public sites and monuments, and 
commemorations that would reactivate memory and shape collective participation.77 In 
the process of shaping people’s memories, a substantial importance is devoted to the 
close alliance between the state and the production of history textbooks. 
 The history textbook is a part of the education system that, in turn, is an im-
portant factor in the nation-state building process. Aleida Assmann claims that educa-
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tion is an important factor because it is through the learning of history that the heteroge-
neous members of a population are transformed into a homogenous collective with a 
collective “autobiography.”78 Thus, history textbooks serve as the vehicles of national 
memory, which in turn, serves as backbone for the nation-state. Furthermore, history 
textbooks can promote such national values as tolerance, patriotism, and dignity by con-
structing distinctive heroic narratives.79 It is logical that a nation-state would want to 
emphasize the heroic and glorious past for nation-building purposes; however, the 
events that are regarded distinct and heroic are also a matter of interpretation by various 
narratives. 
 Aleida Assmann concludes that history textbooks and other representations of 
national narratives can be analyzed on the principles of selectivity, i.e. what kind of 
facts and interpretations they include in their body.80 Keeping in mind that people’s 
memory constructs and perceptions can be changed in contrast to the past event, which 
cannot, greater attention should be devoted to both – the nation-state and history text-
books – what is the focus of this research. There is also a question, however, as to what 
kind of past should be brought up in nation-building discourse. Should it be remote, glo-
rious, recent or less distinct? 
Answering the question, nation-states turn to a more remote past to provide evi-
dence of their distinct historical roots when recent history denies their claims to nation-
hood. Furthermore, the portrayal of this remote past is shaped by the need to highlight a 
symbolic continuity with the present.81 By accepting this link between distinct historical 
roots and nationhood it is possible to claim that Belarus would have to focus on the pe-
riod of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a distinct and glorious past when a state that 
was ruled by Belarusians had a crucial influence in the region. The official national nar-
rative, however, does not stress the aforementioned importance of the medieval ages. 
Instead, the official narrative is stressing the importance of the Soviet period in the for-
mation of the Belarusian nation. The alternative national narrative, on the other hand, 
promoted by the opposition groups, focuses on the medieval ages to emphasize distinct 
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and glorious roots of Belarusian people, thus creating two narratives of Belarusian na-
tionhood. 
One of the problems with the Belarusian nation-building process and the period 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is that the collective subjects, the people who remem-
ber did not exist as such at the time of the events. In this regard, their constitution as 
subjects goes hand in hand with the continuous creation of the past if the state refers to 
the medieval past.82 This introduces the contested relationship between the official and 
alternative national narratives in Belarus since only the official narrative can be con-
structed and facilitated by the state institutions per se. Thus, it is necessary to analyze 
both narratives in order to comprehend and distinguish between the two. Since there is 
only one Belarusian set of events and processes that actually happened, each narrative is 
silencing some events, emphasizing, highlighting and interpreting others. By doing so, 
there is a possibility that both narratives might overlap in their interpretations. This rela-
tionship between the official and the alternative narratives and their contents is also 
overviewed in this thesis. 
Even though the theoretical concept of political memory is not the primary theo-
retical ground for this research, it was necessary to overview the concept in order to 
show the existing relationship between the nation-building process and the application 
of particular usable past to activate certain memories with regard to particular period of 
Belarusian history. Therefore, there is an interconnection between the collective 
memory creation and the nation-building process in which both processes interrelate 
and interact with one another to achieve certain national goals. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There is a wide variety of works on nationalism and nation-building in the field, howev-
er, there is a lack of studies focused on Belarusian nation-building, especially in regard 
to other regional nations. It is possible to claim that Nicolas Vakar’s book Belarussia: 
The Making of a Nation that was published in 1956 was the first academic study of Bel-
arusian society and therefore the most cited in existing research on Belarus’s history. 
Together with Jan Zaprudnik (Belarus: at a Crossroads of History, published in 1993) 
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they were at the center of the greater part of existing academic work on Belarus for sev-
eral decades. 
In 1956, according to Nicholas Vakar, preceding his research no comprehensive 
study of Belarus had been found and, moreover, one hardly could speak of the Belarus-
ians as a distinct society.83 The situation has improved after 1956, but in early 1990s 
researchers still lacked a clear historiography of Belarusian national development. Start-
ing with the 2000s more research started to appear on Belarusian history, identity and, 
society. In 2003, however, Timothy Snyder claimed that systematic investigation of the 
Belarusian national failure in the context of the success of other national movements 
was unprecedented.84 The year 2003 also marked the first attempt to understand Bela-
rusian post-Soviet nation-building process by Grigory Ioffe in terms of various narrated 
models of nationalism. In 2007 Ioffe claimed that Belarus remained one of the least–
studied European states to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union and therefore 
little was known about Belarus besides the undemocratic practices of its president, Al-
yaksandr Lukashenka.85 Nevertheless, starting with the early 2000s more and more re-
searchers began working on Belarus in terms of conceptualizing its national develop-
ment after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Among such scholars Natalia Leshchenko, Natalia Mamul, Grigory Ioffe, Nelly 
Bekus and Yuliya Chernyavskaya must be mentioned. They defined various approaches 
to the study of Belarusian national development such as pro-European, Nativist, pro-
Moscow/Russian, pro-Soviet, Creole and others. Furthermore, such scholars as Nelly 
Bekus and later Renee Buhra distinguished between the official model of Belarusian 
national development and the alternative model. Therefore, a case study by Tatiana 
Kasperski about the Chernobyl nuclear accident could give a good example of how the-
se models interpret a particular event from the Belarusian past.86 
In terms of more comprehensive analyses of Belarus’s national development and 
national discourse, several books might be selected: Belarus – a Perpetual Borderland 
(2009) by Andrew Savchenko, Struggle Over Identity (2010) by Nelly Bekus and Bela-
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rus: the Last Dictatorship in Europe (2011) by Andrew Wilson. These books are exten-
sively used in this research and provide a good analysis of Belarus’s domestic nation-
building politics. The latest work on Belarusian identity, however, is that of by Francois 
Zdanowicz who wrote a dissertation on Myths of Nationhood and Support for State Sov-
ereignty in Belarus in 2013. It is a comprehensive analysis of Belarusian national de-
velopment narratives. 
 It should be concluded that there is a lack of existing research on Belarusian his-
tory textbooks, especially in terms of focused narrative analysis of a particular nation’s 
representation. Tatyana Ostrovskaya so far had conducted the most comprehensive re-
search in 2010 when she analyzed Belarusian history textbooks published from 1993 
until 2009. Her research, however, leaves place for additional research on Belarusian 
history textbooks because it was an analysis of narrative rather than an examination of 
other nations’ representation. Therefore, this particular research contributes to the exist-
ing knowledge on the Belarusian post-Soviet nation-building process, as well as pre-
sents one of the first academic analyses of the representation of Lithuania in Belarusian 
history textbooks published in 2009 and 2010. 
 
The Research Methodology 
 
While some scholars might underestimate the relevance of studying history textbooks 
and neglect such a study’s ability to produce consistent germane conclusions, for histo-
rians, according to John Inssitt, “(…) the process of unpacking various elements reflect-
ed and expressed in textbooks is richly revealing.”87 It is especially revealing to study 
the narrative of history textbooks in terms of the role of education in nation-building 
process, as well as construction of knowledge and manipulative ability of state power 
and ideology. 
The representation of Belarusian national narrative and representation of Lithua-
nia in Belarusian history textbooks are in the focus of the research. Therefore, the re-
search methodology lies in the interpretive approach to analysis of narrative constructed 
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by the textbooks and its intent.88 This approach to textbook analysis is concerned with 
the content rather than procedure through which the content had been acquired. Recog-
nizing complex relations between the nation-building process and education, the re-
search also incorporates limited analysis of political speeches and statements around the 
Belarusian nation-building process made by the President Lukashenka together with the 
present-day expressions of Belarusian nationalism in various forms. Limited analysis of 
political speeches in this research is used to portray certain relationship between the 
events “on the ground” and the political statements made by President Lukashenka him-
self. Lukashenka’s speeches, therefore, are mainly used to justify certain conclusions 
made by the author, or to signalize the beginning of particular processes initiated, or 
marked by the President. The textbook analysis, however, is the central part of this re-
search. 
 The aforementioned method of narrative analysis can be closely related to the 
qualitative method of research where narratives are analyzed by themes and catego-
ries.89 Overall, narrative research uses literary devices and allows multiple interpreta-
tions by multiple readers. Therefore, the task of narrative inquiry is not to describe a 
phenomenon as it is but to re-describe the events or phenomena by offering various in-
terpretations to the reader.90 Furthermore, interpretation of not only the texts is valuable 
but also looking at visual representation of narratives might support or refute certain 
assumptions. Visual illustrations are especially capable of emphasizing the narrative of 
another nation’s representation in Belarusian history textbooks. In this research, text-
book narratives are interpreted with regard to various expressions of national narrative 
in Belarusian public space. 
 Interpretivist narrative researchers conduct their analysis by reading the body of 
evidence as a whole and then generating assertions. Each assertion is later affirmed or 
discarded and for each surviving assertion a vignette is constructed that demonstrates 
the truth of the assertion in narrative form. Thereafter, an assertion is framed in interpre-
tive commentary with relevant data.91 In terms of this research, the assertions from Bel-
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arus’s official national narrative in history textbooks were framed within the context of 
Belarusian nation-building process and the binary opposition between the official and 
the alternative national narratives. 
 For this research, four history textbooks published in 2009 and 2010 were ana-
lyzed from Belarus’s schools with the Russian language of instruction. The choice of 
the textbooks was made on the basis of existing research made by Tatyana Ostrovskaya. 
This existing research helped to define textbooks of which grades should be used to 
cover the necessary periodization. In terms of periodization, this research mainly focus-
es on the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Belarus’s history textbooks, which 
covered the time from the mid-thirteenth century until 1795 when it was partitioned and 
became the part of the Russian Empire. Besides that, Ostrovskaya concluded that the 
textbooks from 2009 and 2010 represented the post-2002 national narrative in its con-
tent that is explained later in this research. All four textbooks were closely read by the 
author with regard to particular chapters about Belarus’s medieval past and the history 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in particular. 
The text and the interpretation of the textbooks’ content were in the center of 
this method, however, also the maps used in the textbooks were evaluated. Therefore, 
historical narratives of the textbooks were interpreted with regard to the representation 
of Belarus’s national narrative and the representation of Lithuania and the Lithuanians. 
It was very important to understand the general attitude of the textbooks’ narratives to-
wards the research objects; thus, particular attention was devoted to particular words 
and visual representation that was used in the textbooks to describe the role of the Bela-
rusians and of the Lithuanians in relation to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. After under-
standing the general trends and narrative patterns, the author retold the narrative story 
with particular interpretation of the narrative in terms of is belonging to the official or 
the alternative national narrative of Belarus’s nationalism. In terms of the representation 
of the Lithuanians, the author constructed a particular narrative using the information 
provided in the textbooks in order to conclude how the Lithuanians themselves and their 
role was portrayed in regard to the creation and maintenance of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. 
It is believed that such a research method is able to answer the research question, 
satisfy the research aim, as well as, to evaluate the hypotheses. Responding to concerns 
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expressed by some of the Lithuanian historians, this research tries to answer the ques-
tion whether the Belarus’s history textbooks are “rewriting” the Lithuanian past. Initial-
ly, however, the research sets broader aim and tries to understand the Belarus’s nation-
building process in general. The process of conducting the research revealed the com-
plexity of the Belarus’s nation-building case in which several periods of national devel-
opment can be pointed out starting with 1991. Furthermore, by relative underdevelop-
ment, the present condition of Belarus’s nationalism is quite different from the experi-
ence of other regional actors making the research even more fascinating. Therefore, the 
author also asks broader questions in regard to Belarus’s domestic nation-building pro-
cess and its relation towards Belarus’s foreign policy choices starting with 1991. 
Relying on the preliminary study for this research and several existing assump-
tions, two hypotheses were formulated. First: the Belarusian national narrative in history 
textbooks does not challenge the Lithuanian national narrative, but seeks to highlight 
and empower the “Belarusianness” of their shared past for the nation-building purposes. 
Second: the more the official Belarusian narrative tries to establish a Belarusian national 
idea, the more it resembles the alternative narrative of Belarusian opposition. It is be-
lieved that the research and the empirical case supplemented by the methodology and 
the theoretical framework are able to evaluate the hypotheses, answer the research ques-
tion and achieve the aim of the research. 
In terms of the variables, the Belarusian national narrative in the history text-
books, which is also the official national narrative, is defined as the independent varia-
ble because it does not change in the chosen textbooks and is consistent with its content. 
The concept of the official national narrative has been discussed before and also applies 
to the narrative in the textbooks. This variable, however, is also conceptualized between 
the official and the alternative narrative. The Lithuanian national narrative is defined as 
the dependent variable because it is also the research question – to see how it is being 
constructed and, therefore, changed from its original story. This variable is conceptual-
ized as the official Lithuanian narrative on the creation and maintenance of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania and differs from the Belarus’s narrative in some substantial matters. 
For example, that king Mindaugas was or was not crowned in the city of Navahrudak 
(Навагрудак). 
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Therefore, the independent variable either challenges the dependent variable, or 
empowers the “Belarusianness,” which is the intervening variable in the first hypothe-
sis. The process of empowering the “Belarusianness” is operationalized as the process 
when particular features of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are interpreted in favor of the 
Belarusian culture or the Belarusian nation even though they are rather contested. For 
example, the Belarusian language is presented as the official language of the Duchy in 
the textbooks. The question arises, however, whether it was the Belarusian language, as 
we know it today, or significantly different, Slavic-type language that is not mentioned 
in the textbooks. This is also a set of indicators that I use for the research, which signal-
ize whether the “Belarusianness” is empowered and therefore, the Lithuanian national 
narrative is challenged. 
It is believed that the methodology and the theoretical framework are able to un-
cover and explain the empirical part of the thesis in particular. As it was outlined in the 
first chapter, the explanatory power of the ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism 
studies is able to understand the present condition of Belarus’s nation-building process. 
Moreover, the ethno-symbolist approach is able to explain why the official and the al-
ternative narratives, which exist in Belarus’s public sphere focus on different historical 
periods, values and myths in their work to achieve rather similar goals – to unite the 
Belarusian nation. In comparison, the perennialist and the modernist approaches to na-
tionalism studies fail to explain the logic behind the both narratives even though they 
may explain some of the narratives separately. 
It is also believed that the interpretive methodology is suitable for the analysis of 
history textbooks because it is the text and the meaning of the textbooks’ narrative that 
is in the focus of the study. Therefore, by interpreting the narrative using the existing 
knowledge on Belarus’s nationalism it is possible to evaluate whether the textbooks’ 
narrative supports the official national narrative and whether it has certain sentiments 
towards the alternative national narrative. In relation towards the representation of Lith-
uanians in Belarus’s history textbooks, there is a certain narrative in the textbooks, 
which can be uncovered differently be different scholars, therefore, the interpretive 
method is suitable for the intentions of my particular research to try to evaluate the nar-
rative in terms of the Belarus’s complicated nation-building process. Thus, it seems that 
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the methodology is successful in helping to uncover the empirical part and conduct the 
research per se. 
The chosen research method, however, is only able to construct the interpretive 
knowledge rather than a general understanding of phenomena. Qualitative methods may 
be more successful with regard to understanding the way information is presented; 
however, it is hard to make generalizations from such qualitative textbook analyses.92 
Therefore, this narrative research is unable to provide a general framework for analysis 
of Belarusian history textbooks with regard to various expressions of Belarusian nation-
al narrative. The stronger side of the method, however, is that the knowledge is con-
structed through transactions among academic research, participants, evidence and the 
social context of the phenomena.93 Thus, Belarusian national narrative has to be treated 
as a complex phenomenon that is produced by the multifaceted process of interaction 
between various actors. 
 School curriculum, furthermore, is the knowledge system of a society incorpo-
rating its values and its dominant ideology.94 Therefore, conducting interpretive narra-
tive research allows seeing the interaction between the dominant ideology in the official 
discourse and the public sphere, i.e. how are the dominant ideas reflected in the school 
curriculum and vice versa. In order to broaden the possible application of history text-
books research, it is supplemented with the analysis of the official documents of the Re-
public of Belarus that cover the study of the subject “World History. History of Bela-
rus.” It is done in order to analyze whether the official documents resemble the ideals 
and values of the official national narrative that is facilitated by the government itself. 
This research, however, also looks at media and public campaigns/initiatives that might 
emphasize different ideas from the state-promoted official national narrative. In this re-
gard, different expressions of Belarusian nationalism are interpreted to see the possible 
meaning of such public expressions with regard to the predefined criteria of the official 
and the alternative national narratives. 
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 It is believed that the interpretive and largely qualitative methods, together with 
the understanding of the empirical case, are able to answer the research questions as 
well as to evaluate the defined hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING BELARUSIAN 
NATIONALISM 
 
By recognizing the complexity and diversity of Belarusian nation-building, this re-
search, on the empirical level, also challenges the view that Belarus is a “denational-
ized” nation that failed to produce a consolidated nation after the dissolution of the So-
viet Union. Contrary to the assumption that a Belarusian nation “failed” to form, this 
chapter tends to recognize and understand the ongoing process of Belarusian nation-
building, starting with the thirteenth century. 
The first chapter outlined different perceptions of nationalism as understood by 
primordialist and modernist/constructivist scholars. It was agreed that some of the ap-
proaches tend to offer better explanation of nationalism according to different configu-
rations in particular case studies. Trying to understand Belarusian nationalism, Alexan-
der Pershai questioned the existing nationalism paradigms in their application to the 
expressions of Belarusian nationalism in particular. By doing so, he used a conceptual 
relationship of major/minor suggested by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.95 Pershai 
questions existing paradigms of nationalism studies which tend to distinguish between 
clichés of “developed,” “underdeveloped” and “developing” nations. According to ex-
isting paradigms, Belarusian nation is still in the process of development and, moreo-
ver, is considered to resemble an example of the “delayed” nationalism. According to 
major/minor relationship, however, Pershai claims that Belarusians emerged as a nation 
a long time ago, but due to the political, historical, economic and regional peculiarities 
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it developed into an “unconventional,” minor form of nationalism.96 In this regard, the 
author concludes, that it is valuable to question the essence of modern nationalism dis-
course and change the existing paradigms of evaluating nations according to the criteria 
that are not universal and no longer reflect the state of modern nations. 
 Pershai’s critique of modern scholarship is also applicable to Benedict Ander-
son’s understanding of nations because it is based on the rejection of totalities such as a 
sole focus on language. Moreover, Pershai claims: “(…) the rejection of totalities is the 
key for understanding the alternative modes of nationalism in Belarus.”97 It is a valuable 
critique of not only modern paradigms of nationalism but also of the alternative narra-
tive of Belarusian nationalism since it tends to rely on the existing framework of West-
ern nationalism studies such as were discussed in the theoretical framework for this dis-
sertation. 
 It is useful to question the explanatory power of nationalism studies with regard 
to particular empirical cases. Alexander Pershai’s research introduces a complicated ex-
ample of Belarusian national consciousness that has been shaped by various actors with-
in and outside the Belarusian state. More precisely, the debate on Belarusian national-
ism has been shaped by Western and Belarusian scholars whose research is rarely con-
nected and, furthermore, aimed at different audiences.98 Thus, it is necessary to incorpo-
rate a broader possible debate on the question of Belarusian nationalism and its devel-
opment through time and space. This discussion starts with the time when Belarus ac-
quired its independence in 1991. 
 
Belarusian Identity Politics 1991-2002 
 
The political nationalism of modern Belarus was born in 1988 when a mass grave of 
thousands of bodies was found in Kurapaty, on the outskirts of Minsk.99 Public reaction 
resulted in the creation of Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) that was established in Octo-
ber of the same year and was led by Zianon Pazniak (Зянон Пазняк).100 After the proc-
lamation of Belarusian independence, the BPF became the leading organization in for-
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mulating a Belarusian political agenda and nation-building policies. The BPF’s national 
narrative can be called pro-Western, pro-European and Nativist since is it focused on 
the pre-Soviet Belarusian past, identifying Belarusian history primarily with Europe and 
the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The national policies of the BPF and post-
Soviet Belarus resembled the classical identity-creating steps of countries recently liber-
ated from imperial domination.101 The nation-building policies in post-Soviet Belarus, 
however, were affected by the strong dependency of the new Belarusian economy on 
the Russian Federation together with the strong presence of the Russian military forces 
and strategic bases on the territory of independent Belarus. 
 In this regard, the BPF’s nation-building task of the newly established state was 
rather obscured by the country’s strong economic and military dependency on Russia. 
In 1992, 10 percent of Belarus was under the jurisdiction of “military structures” pri-
marily used by Russia. Furthermore, there were even strong concerns that Belarus 
would be able to develop a “national army” since its army did not really reflect the eth-
nic makeup of the republic’s population and was controlled mainly by the pro-Russian 
oriented command.102 In 1992, the Belarusian Prime Minister from the BPF Vyacheslav 
Kebich (Вячаслаў Кебіч) said: “If we are a nation, we should have our own national 
relics. With the poor national arsenal we have received in all spheres of our spiritual 
life, we can hardly convince our contemporaries and descendants that we have a history 
of our own.”103 It signified that Belarus had to transform its post-Soviet state in order to 
develop independent national narrative that would allow emphasize Belarus’s distinct 
historical past. 
 One of important steps in state’s nation-building process is country’s ability for 
an independent economic development. Other post-Soviet countries such as the Baltic 
States had already completed the privatization process of small enterprises by 1994 and 
therefore had initiated the free market economic reforms. In Belarus, however, this pro-
cess was much slower. Moreover, it seems that the BPF failed to successfully privatize 
large and small enterprises that would allow the country to continue its neoliberal re-
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forms. Even though Belarus intentionally was moving towards market economy in 
1990s, the process had been relatively slow and later even reversed by the Lukashenka 
administration in 1994 when the administration decided to preserve the economic struc-
ture of Belarus as close to its original Soviet shape as possible.104 
In terms of the BPF’s nation-building policies, however, it failed to produce a 
strong appeal for a Belarusian distinct past and due to ethnocentrism it could not incor-
porate large numbers of non-Belarusian peoples who did not speak Belarusian. The BPF 
was too nationalistic in their vision and wanted to make Belarus more “Belarusian” in 
terms of Belarusian language and distinct Belarusian symbols. The BPF considered the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania a Belarusian state and claimed that the Soviet period was a 
tragic mistake.105 The BPF failed to recognize still existing sentiments towards the So-
viet Union and offered to dismiss the Soviet period that constituted an important part of 
people’s lives. Collective memory of the Soviet period in 1990s was still living and too 
strong to be dismantled by the political nationalism of the BPF. Primary success of the 
BPF, however, was in visual manifestation of the new, post-Soviet Belarusian identity. 
 In 1991 the Supreme Soviet adopted the white-red-white flag and the coat of 
arms, called Pahonia, as new national symbols of the independent Republic, thus direct-
ly linking post-Soviet Belarus with the political entity of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
since Pahonia was also a symbol of the Grand Duchy. Nowadays, these symbols are as-
sociated with the Belarusian political opposition, as well as with the alternative expres-
sions of the Belarusian nationalism. Even though the BPF stood for the fair representa-
tion of Belarusian history, many scholars claim that its political failure was due to its 
definition of the nation and expressions of nationalism that were not applicable to the 
demographic and linguistic composition of the post-Soviet state.106 Even though there 
were around 80 percent of Belarusians in 1990s, only around 40 percent would claim 
Belarusian as the language they spoke at homes.107 The BPF, however, built their na-
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tion-building campaign emphasizing the use of Belarusian language in everyday life 
that did not rather pro-Russian sentiments of the post-Soviet society. In other words, the 
BPF got the idea of nationalism wrong, but the new President Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
got it right. 
 The period from 1991 until the election of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in 1994 is 
characterized by the development of what is today known as the alternative national 
narrative. The introduction of the “new past” in the early 1990s started with the draft of 
the new Belarusian constitution that spoke for a “(…) centuries-old development of 
Belarusian statehood” that was “reflected in the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia, the Constituent Charters of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, and the Constitu-
tions of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic.”108 Thus, the early independent repub-
lic mainly focused on the pre-Soviet and pre-Imperial Belarusian identity that had been 
developing in various forms since the thirteenth century. Already in the beginning of 
1990s, however, the BPF was not the only entity to represent an alternative version of 
Belarusian nationalism in Belarusian public sphere. More ephemeral satellite groups 
like “Talaka” or “Martyrolah Belarusi” developed in Belarus that expressed certain nar-
ratives, which were different from the Soviet interpretation of Belarusian nationalism, 
however, were less political in comparison to that of the BPF.109 
 Alternative expressions of Belarusian nationalism do not exist as a single con-
cept like the official national narrative.110 Even though the 1991-1994 narrative was 
considered official at that time, presently, the same narrative refers to the alternative 
vision of Belarusian national development since the groups that supported it in the 
1990s are now in opposition to present Belarusian government. In this regard, the alter-
native national narrative is seen as an aggregate of various narratives that do not corre-
spond to the official narrative promoted and maintained by the Belarusian government. 
Thus, in comparison to the official narrative, which can be summarized by looking on 
official representation, discourse and state systems such as education, the alternative 
narrative appears in a form of public discourse that takes place in public media, Internet, 
public space, academia, as well as various non-governmental and oppositional bodies. 
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 Therefore, the alternative national narrative can be defined as a set of ideas 
about Belarusian national development and present nation-building policies that contra-
dict with the official national narrative in terms of what is considered to better charac-
terize modern Belarusian nation. For example, the official narrative considers the day 
when Minsk was liberated from the German forces during the Second World War to be 
more important for modern Belarusian history rather than the day when Belarus pro-
claimed its independence in 1991. Besides that, the official narrative tends to distance 
Belarusian history from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania claiming that it does not fully 
reflect modern Belarus’s values. The alternative narrative, on the other hand, sees mod-
ern Belarus as a political entity that developed from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Al-
so, the alternative narrative claims that Belarusian language developed from the 
“Rusky” language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but the apogee of political devel-
opment took place in 1918 when Belarusian People’s Republic was proclaimed.111 
Thus, the alternative narrative rejects the Soviet past in its intentions to define inde-
pendent Belarusian nation on the basis of the pre-Soviet past. 
 During the process of nation-building in early 1990s in educational and cultural 
institutions, the Belarusian language was steadily replacing Russian and the majority of 
society gradually accepted such changes.112 Furthermore, the language policy and visi-
ble ethnocentrism became the most evident signs of change from the Soviet period; it 
was planned that by 1999 all Belarusian universities would switch to Belarusian as the 
main language of instruction. It was a hard task, however, because the Belarusian peo-
ple did not really speak the Belarusian language on the same level as Russian; moreo-
ver, they had a strong identification with the Soviet Union rather than with the new re-
public.113 Identification with pan-Russian identity and fears of a stronger Belarusian na-
tionalism resulted in victory of a populist candidate Alyaksandr Lukashenka who after 
1994 consolidated his power and engaged in construction of rather eclectic form of Bel-
arusian identity. More precisely, Lukashenka offered stability and security together with 
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a good “golden past” that was closer to the still existing Soviet mentality of the Belarus-
ian people, unlike the pre-Soviet past offered by the BPF.114 
 Overall task of the BPF in early 1990s was quite complicated since it wanted to 
foster a Belarusian historical past connected to the West, but the economic dependency 
together with military dependency on Russia kept Belarus tightly connected to a Rus-
sian and Eastern orientation rather than a Western one. Together with shortsighted eth-
nocentric national policy and lack of a strong presidential candidate, the BPF was una-
ble to succeed in the first Belarusian presidential elections of 1994. Soon after the elec-
tions, Lukashenka started reintroducing the pro-Soviet version of Belarusian nationhood 
that was mainly connected with the Belarusian SSR, the indigenization policies of the 
Soviet Union, as well as the Second World War, as the unifying element of the nation. 
In 1995 Lukashenka started a campaign against independent historians and withdrew 
post-1991 history textbooks from Belarusian schools, reintroducing the Soviet edition of 
textbooks.115 The Soviet textbooks, therefore, stressed Belarusian joint historical devel-
opment with Russians in a common state together with the emphasis of Belarusian na-
tional glory during the Second World War.116 
 In a symbolic way, the Soviet-era history textbooks reintroduced the collective 
memory of Belarus being developed mainly with the help of the Soviet Union in 1920s. 
Moreover, the political memory about the Soviet past started to be promoted by the 
government itself via the centralized system of mass education. The Soviet-era text-
books once again stressed Belarusian joint historical development with Russia in a 
common state together with the emphasis of Belarusian national glory during the Se-
cond World War.117 With the re-introduction of the Soviet-era textbooks a reactionary 
turn took place without any real intentions to consolidate national idea that would stress 
merits of the independent Belarusian state.118 The Belarusian researcher Tatyana Os-
trovskaya concluded in her research that the post-1995 period was characterized by in-
tentions to fight the Belarusian nation-building project that had been formed during the 
1991-1994 period. In the Soviet-era history textbooks Belarusian were characterized as 
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Slavs, West-Russians and Russians. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Lukashenka’s 
first nation-building policies were rather reactionary and focused on elimination of ideas 
that Belarus was an independent and different country from Russia. One important as-
pect of this period is that the government’s facilitated political memory tended to devel-
op the idea that Belarusians had been called Russians throughout Belarus’s history. 
One thousand nine hundred ninety five should be considered the year when the 
state promoted political memory that did not want to recognize the Belarus’s pre-Soviet 
past started to be developed. It is also the year, however, when the official national nar-
rative of the Lukashenka’s regime started to develop. The official narrative is defined as 
a set of ideas about Belarusian national development and present nation-building poli-
cies that are characterized by the Russophile and pro-Soviet orientation that stems from 
the Orthodox cultural tradition where Russian is seen as the prime cultural donor play-
ing a pivotal role in shaping Belarus’ statehood.119 The post-1995 narrative is character-
ized by the acceptance of the Soviet heritage and Belarusian present as the preservation 
of all the best from the Soviet life. Such values as stability and security dominated over 
the claims for individuality. Furthermore, the pro-Russian narrative saw Russia as the 
main strategic partner for economic and political development of Belarus.120 Besides 
that, Russophile historiography saw Belarusian identity tied to Russian and Easter Slav-
ic territories of Kievan Rus’ with ignorance to repressions towards the Belarusian iden-
tity during the nineteenth century and the Soviet period in general.121 
The Soviet period within the framework of the official narrative is seen as a pe-
riod when Belarusian identity was recognized politically and linguistically, especially in 
1920s when Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic was established. The Soviet territory of 
Belarus in 1920s, under the policy of indigenization (korenizatsiya), was able to devel-
op certain national consciousness and representation within the USSR. At some point, 
even the attempt to recreate the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania was taken under 
the name “Lit-Bel.”122 Even though the “Lit-Bel” project gradually vanished, Moscow 
supported Belarusian culture in various ways: schools with Belarusian language of in-
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struction were opened, the Academy of Science was established together with the Bela-
rusian State University, Institute of Belarusian Culture, State Library etc.123 Such Bela-
rusian poets as Yanka Kupala (Янка Купала) and Yakub Kolas (Якуб Колас) promoted 
Belarusian national-consciousness in culture. In 1920 Yanka Kupala wrote a play Tu-
teysha (The Locals) where he created a cultural term of Belarusian local individualism 
mentioned earlier – тутэйшасць.124 But Yakub Kolas, on the other hand, promoted the 
vital characteristic of Belarusian mentality – local consciousness. These poets are also 
largely recognized by the Lukashenka regime and their presence is maintained in Bela-
rusian collective memory through the public space, for example, one of the main 
squares in Minsk is named after Yakub Kolas but one of the parks near the Presidential 
palace is called after Yanka Kupala. 
 Lukashenka’s first years in office also marked a symbolical change from the 
1991-1994 narrative. Less than a year after the elections of May 14, 1995 a referendum 
was held in which voters were asked if they wanted to give the same status to the Rus-
sian language as to Belarusian, to replace the Belarusian flag and coat of arms with new 
symbols derived from Soviet period, and whether people supported Lukashenka’s eco-
nomic policy towards greater integration with Russia.125 Another, non-binding question 
was asked if people agreed to amend the 1994 Constitution and allow the President to 
dissolve the Supreme Soviet in case of necessity. In public voting, the Belarusian people 
supported all four questions and thus expressed their dissatisfaction with the policy of 
previous government led by the BPF. The fourth question, however, had the most far-
reaching consequences for the political changes in Belarus in the upcoming years. 
 The new state symbols were directly taken from the Belarus’s Soviet past. In 
1953 Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic adopted a new flag with Belarusian ornaments 
on the left side, hammer and sickle in the left corner, green stripe on the bottom and the 
main body in red. The referendum of 1995 re-invented the Soviet-style flag changing 
the structure of the ornament and removing the obvious symbols of the Soviet Unions – 
hammer and sickle. The 1991-1995 symbols were now presented as an artificial inven-
tion of Belarusian Central Council in 1943-1944 thus breaking their historical connec-
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tion with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.126 After the referendum, the new state symbols 
had to be introduced to people’s daily lives. Thus, the display of the new flag and coat 
of arms became compulsory for the state institutions; the Pahonia emblem itself was 
taken off the passports in December 1996. Furthermore, Belarusian Independence Day 
was transferred from July 27, when the sovereignty from the Soviet Union was de-
clared, to July 3, when Minsk was liberated from Nazi occupants during the Second 
World War.127 It was a symbolic break with the national narrative introduced by the 
BPF in early 1990s. Lukashenka’s domestic practice, however, had greater implications 
for Belarusian political representation in the region and bilateral relations with Russia. 
 In a second referendum of November 24, 1996 Belarusian people supported an 
increase of president’s powers together with the pro-Russian direction of Belarus’s na-
tional development. Voters allowed the President to appoint local administrators, thus 
establishing president’s vertical structure of power.128 The referendum also expressed a 
symbolic agreement with Lukashenka’s pro-Russian policies. Domestic discourse about 
the close historical association of Belarus and Russia allowed Belarus to request greater 
political integration with Russia. First, Belarus and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation in February 1995 allowing the Russian military to continue using mili-
tary facilities on Belarusian soil. Later, a Customs Union was signed allowing Belarus-
ian manufacturers to reestablish the Soviet-era supply chain that strongly relied on Rus-
sian goods. On April 2, 1996, a treaty on the formation of a commonwealth between 
Belarus and Russia was signed, creating several supra-national institutions like the Su-
preme Council, the Executive Committee, and the Parliamentary Assembly. The apo-
gee, however, was achieved on December 8, 1999 when the Treaty on the Creation of 
the Union State of Russia and Belarus was signed, proposing a greater integration of the 
two states in political, economic, military, monetary and judicial terms.129 
 Thus, reconsideration of the Belarusian national narrative supported the direct 
policy of political and economic integration with the Russian Federation. It is hard to 
claim what would have happened if Boris Yeltsin had remained President of Russia. His 
successor Vladimir Putin, however, did not share the same vision of bilateral integration 
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on equal terms. More precisely, in summer 2002, Vladimir Putin claimed that the only 
possible way of integration of the two states was Belarus’s incorporation into the Rus-
sian Federation.130 Obviously, it was not an acceptable way for Belarus to claim its 
identity and regional representation. 
Even though Lukashenka exercised pro-Russian nation-building politics, he still 
remained pro-Belarusian in his own way. In terms of the post-2002 nation-building poli-
tics, Lukashenka can be understood as “the main anti-Belarusian nationalist of Bela-
rus.”131 After 2002, some researchers claim that Lukashenka started to exercise the Cre-
ole way of nation-building recognizing the pro-Russian narrative and the Soviet influ-
ence together with recognition of distinct pre-Soviet historical past of Belarus.132 Thus, 
Lukashenka started shifting towards an understanding that Belarusian identity was es-
sentially different from its Soviet and Russian counterparts even though it was largely 
produced under their influence. 
 It is reasonable to suggest that both aforementioned narratives have been con-
tributing to Belarusian identity; however, they primarily focused on different historical 
periods, as well as different values that the Belarusian people possessed. If the Nativist 
narrative stressed Belarusian individuality together with its distinct historical past, then 
the pro-Soviet narrative emphasized Belarusian collectivity and the historical connec-
tion with Russia within the Soviet Union. The situation, however, changed after 2002 
when Lukashenka’s pro-Soviet narrative did not find its political support in Russia. The 
possible impasse of nation-building politics forced the Lukashenka regime to reconsider 
its national narrative by broadening it in terms of recognizing the Belarusian pre-Soviet 
past and its importance for modern Belarusian identity. Thus, starting with 2002 it is 
possible to see a certain shift in the official rhetoric with regard to the Belarusian histor-
ical past, as well as the roots of Belarusian nationhood. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Leshchenko, 341. 
131 Ioffe, Culture Wars…, 367. 
132 The concept of Creole is defined on the basis of Benedict Anderson’s definition of Creole states as 
communities who shared a common language and common descent with those against whom they re-
belled. Anderson, 47. 
51 
	  
Belarusian Identity Discourse 2002 – present 
 
Belarus’s post-2002 identity discourse represents a broader understanding of Belarusian 
identity, going beyond a sole focus on state actions and its nation-building politics. 
Identity discourse also focuses on various expressions of official and alternative nation-
al narratives conducted by NGOs, represented in media or public initiatives, and ex-
pressed in public symbols such as monuments, street names, or promoted by music and 
cultural groups. 
 It seems that before 2002 neither Western, nor regional scholars had engaged in 
a debate over various expression of Belarusian nationalism. In 2003, Grigory Ioffe out-
lined two visions of Belarus, one having a Western orientation and second – a pro-
Moscow one. Later, in 2007 Ioffe added a third model of Creole nationalism that found 
its expressions in the nation-building policies expressed by the Lukashenka regime after 
2002, as well as in the version of the Belarusian language that is called “Trasianka.” 
Although “Trasianka” is a mixture of Belarusian and Russian languages, Ioffe claims 
that many people who speak it are today quite patriotic and nationalistic.133 Further-
more, it is vital to understand that there is also a Russian-speaking anti-Lukashenka 
group besides Belarusian-speaking anti-Lukashenka groups. Thus, the opposition to 
Lukashenka’s national narrative is not based on language distinctions only. There are, 
however, two more versions of Belarusian language: “Tarashkevitsa” and “Narkamaw-
ka” that might be assigned to different expressions of Belarusianness, however, they are 
less relevant for this research because they are not attached to particular expressions of 
Belarusian identity as “Trasianka” is.134 
Nowadays, scholars tend to distinguish between various models of Belarusian 
nationalism rather than to focus on Belarusian post-Soviet national development per se. 
Nelly Bekus, for example, distinguishes between the official Belarusianness that is 
based on civic identity and alternative Belarusianness that is based on ethnic defini-
tion.135 By doing so, Bekus incorporates smaller models into two broader categories. 
Analysis by Renee Buhra supports Bekus’s claims that the official narrative is based on 
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civic characteristics of Belarusian nation, and the alternative on ethnic identity. Fur-
thermore, she argues, Belarusian national identity is gravitating towards a form of civic 
nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism.136 In a similar way, Andrew Wilson in his 
book Belarus: the Last Dictatorship in Europe distinguishes between the official and 
alternative identities facilitated by Lukashenka and by the political opposition.137 Wil-
son, however, distinguishes another approach towards Belarusian nationalism – the na-
tion-in-between – that claims that the real key to Belarusian history lies at the cross-
roads of many cultures and thus Belarus is a cross-cultural place where various nations 
and cultures interact without really emphasizing European or Russian dominance.138 
Another scholar, Natalia Mamul claims that there are four post-Soviet templates: 
pro-Russian (imperialist) narrative, the victimized negative ethnic template, the Belarus-
ian nationalist narrative and the pro-Western/pro-democratic scheme.139 The Belarusian 
researcher, Yuliya Chernyavskaya goes further and identifies seven, of what she calls 
competing temptations of Belarusian nation-building.140 Her analysis outlines seven 
possible nation-building choices that the Belarusian nation is experiencing at present in 
terms of its prospective development. 
In 2002, however, the official national narrative transformed and the transfor-
mation is visible in Lukashenka’s speech that he gave at the Brest National University 
of A.S. Pushkin on September 23, 2004. Lukashenka claimed: 
(…) Belarus, in distinction from Poland and the Baltic Countries, has nev-
er, I dare to say, never ever, has it been a part of Western culture and 
Western, especially Western way of life. Yes, we were subjected to the in-
fluence of the Western culture and its way of life, moreover – the Polish 
Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita) and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania – all this has left a mark on us. That influence, however, is al-
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ready gone. Because back then it failed to “sew on” everything Western on 
us, however, it seems that it will fail also today.141 
In this statement, first of all, the President recognized the influence of Western 
culture on Belarusian history, and second, he recognized the influence that the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania had on Belarusian history and the nation in general. This statement 
also represents the Creole version of the official national narrative that would emphasize 
the Belarusian Soviet past together with the recognition of rich Belarusian pre-Soviet 
and pre-Imperial history. The Creole national narrative also recognizes the influence 
that Europe had on Belarus’s past. Since after 2002 Lukashenka no longer sought politi-
cal integration with Russia, it allowed him to pursue more constructive dialogue with 
the European Union. In 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy was developed to in-
clude also Belarus in order to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
actors. Today, even though Belarus remains outside most of the Policy’s structures, it is 
highly possible that more fruitful cooperation will develop which would likely coincide 
with the official national narrative’s greater recognition of the importance of Belarus’s 
European past. 
The aforementioned existence of different conceptualizations of Belarusian na-
tion-building models signifies that Belarusian official nation-building policies are con-
tested by different possible expressions of Belarusian national identity identified by 
scholars based on their researches. Of course, nation-building policies in any country 
can hardly satisfy vision of every interested group, however, is seems that in Belarus 
there are more alternative groups in Belarusian public sphere that express other national 
values and promote different memory from the one promoted by the official narrative. 
These groups vary from music bands to reenactment groups and to groups of public of-
ficials in other Belarusian centers than Minsk. 
In 1999, when Lukashenka’s idea of unification with Russia was still on the 
agenda, a band called Stary Olsa (Стары Ольса) was formed.142 The band claimed to 
play medieval Belarusian music on medieval Belarusian music instruments. The band’s 
goal was the most precise reconstruction of musical traditions of the Grand Duchy of 
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Lithuania. Furthermore, the group has several songs that make direct claim to the Grand 
Duchy, for example, “Літвін,” (Litvin) “Песня пра Вітаўта,” (Song about Vytautas) 
and “Бітва пад Воршай” (The battle on Vorsha). Thus, the band clearly represents an 
alternative national narrative of Belarus, one that claims that the Belarusian nation has 
distinct historical roots in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This narrative, however, is al-
so seen in the Creole official narrative that recognizes the importance of Belarus’s pre-
Soviet past in contemporary nation-building policies. 
Another expression of the alternative national narrative found its way in Bela-
rusian reenactment groups that would reproduce historic battles, tournaments and events 
from the Belarusian past and primarily from the time of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
For example, the medieval military history club, the Duke’s Order (Княжы Гуф), 
which was established in 1999 focuses on the studying of the Grand Duchy of Lithua-
nia, Rus’ and Žemaitija in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries together with recreating 
the attire, ornaments and household of that period.143 Primarily, such groups focus on 
the reconstruction of such notable medieval battles as the Battle of Grunwald or of 
Vorsha; however, they also imitate the daily life of medieval knights. Such practices 
clearly identify the Belarusian historical past with the European tradition, as well as the 
“golden” period of Belarusian history. Furthermore, such groups are not rare in their 
quantity; overall in Belarus there are dozens of such reenactment groups. In 2000, five 
reenactment groups from various Belarusian cities created the association of the 
“Knights of the Grand Duchy” (Рыцары Вялiкага Княства), thus connecting these 
groups to the medieval Belarusian past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
Therefore, music bands and reenactments groups by their repetitive practices not 
only emphasize the alternative national narrative of Belarusian nationhood, but also re-
ject the official national narrative of 1995-2002 when Belarusian historical roots were 
seen in the Soviet past. This rejection, however, is rather unintentional from the side of 
the reenactment groups because they do not carry any political narrative behind their 
practices. Therefore, the rejection is rather symbolic since they simply recreate practices 
that are characteristic to Belarusian medieval past and which are not recognized in the 
state promoted collective memory of the official narrative. 
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 The government, however, could not ignore the symbolic rejection of the official 
narrative by the reenactment groups. The extended geography of the reenactment festi-
vals together with the mass character of the events prompted a response by the govern-
ment since the reenactment groups openly spread the alternative vision of the Belarusian 
historical roots. Thus, the authorities used similar ideas and practices of the reenactment 
groups to revive memories of the Second World War.144 Symbolically in commemorat-
ing the Minsk defenders, on June 30, 2005 a historical and cultural complex, the “Stalin 
line,” was opened that supposedly reconstructed a chain of defensive installations that 
were built from 1928 until 1939 under the direct order of Stalin in order to protect the 
Soviet Western border. The main problem, however, was that the Line was not as im-
portant as the memory presented about it. It was built west of Minsk in 1931-1932 to 
protect the interwar border of the Belarusian SSR and was in considerable disrepair 
when the Germans attacked in 1941.145 Thus, it appears that the modern “Stalin line” 
complex and the myth around it were invented to support the official narrative of Sovi-
et, and Belarusian heroic performance during the war. The invention of the “Stalin line,” 
moreover, supports Eric Hobsbawm’s approach to invention of traditions by modern 
nation-states in support of some greater cause. In Belarusian case, it is in support of the 
official Belarusian national narrative. 
 At this historical complex, however, a symbolic merger of the official and alter-
native narratives took place in 2007 when the complex proposed its property as the site 
for Belarusian Reenactor’s Festival.146 Nelly Bekus claims that it created a historical 
continuity between the representation of medieval knights and more recent heroic 
events of the Second World War. Thus, Belarusian knights are presented as predeces-
sors of the Great Patriotic War heroes who fought for the state in the twentieth century. 
Of course, such an interpretation is possible since Belarusian authorities wanted to pro-
duce a broader understanding of Belarusian national narrative by incorporating certain 
pre-Soviet aspects of Belarusian nationhood. Belarus further recognized the importance 
of reenactment groups and on February 19, 2008 an exhibition about the knights of the 
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Grand Duchy of Lithuania was opened in the National Museum of History and Culture 
of Belarus.147 
 Today, the “Stalin line” has incorporated certain techniques used by the reen-
actment groups and, on special occasions they organize reconstructions of certain battles 
of the Great Patriotic War. The last one took place on February 22, 2014 when the 
Complex organized several reenactments of battles together with performances by pro-
fessional soldiers and war-dogs.148 Such practices clearly mark the similarity between 
the practices of the medieval reenactment groups that represent the alternative national 
narrative, and the twentieth-century reconstruction groups that represent the official na-
tional narrative. Thus, the official narrative not only merges with certain practices of the 
groups representing the alternative national narrative, but also invents myths about the 
Soviet and Belarusian heroic performance during the Second World War. Furthermore, 
it is not surprising that the representatives of the official narrative borrowed several 
practices since the Belarusian government claims to be the repository of Belarusian 
sovereignty together with rights to represent the Belarusian state. 
 Already in 2004 a presidential decree prohibited private Belarusian media from 
using the words “national” or “Belarus” in their names, thus claiming official authority 
over the Belarusian public sphere. Furthermore, social advertising with the motto “For 
Belarus” was introduced in 2004, also pointing to the link between the government and 
the word “Belarus.” In 2005, it was prohibited to use the same words “national,” “Bela-
rus” and “Belarusian” in the names of public organizations.149 Such monopolization of 
the usage of words “national” and “Belarus” led to a relative conflict between the inten-
tions of the youth political organization Malady Front to conduct their St. Valentine 
Day’s political street actions under the slogan “I love Belarus” and the state monopoly 
of Belarusian public space in representations of Belarus.150 Malady Front’s event had 
been taking place since 1997 and therefore Belarusian authorities could not ban it with-
out a reasonable motive. Thus, on February 14, 2007 the pro-governmental youth organ-
ization Belarusian Republican Youth Union conducted their private action under the 
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slogan “For beloved Belarus.”151 This serves as yet another example when Belarusian 
authorities want to claim the state’s authority over the representation of Belarus in the 
public sphere. 
 In general, since 2002 a greater focus on the consolidated Belarusian nation is 
seen in Belarusian public sphere, which is centered on emphasizing Belarusian sover-
eignty and independence under the present political regime. After 2002 various public 
institutions acquired the status and the name “national,” such as the Academy of Sci-
ence, Minsk Airport II and the Central Historical Archive. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Soviet was renamed the “National Assembly.” The new building of the National Library 
of Belarus began construction in November 2002 and was funded by public donations to 
make the project even more national.152 In addition, Belarusian towns acquired their 
personal coats of arms designed by the Council of Heraldic Affairs under the presiden-
tial administration. Thus, towns at the local level also acquired the new Belarusian iden-
tity. 
 Nationalization of the words “Belarus” and “nation” in public discourse was on-
ly one expression of Belarus’s post-2002 nation-building policies. The situation was 
necessarily changed also in Belarus’s linguistic policies. According to 2005 polls, in 
response to the question about native language and mother tongue that Belarusian peo-
ple used, 34.6 percent claimed Russian as their native language in comparison to 30.7 
percent who claimed Belarusian as their native language.153 The situation, however, was 
completely different with regard to mother tongue of respondents. 69 percent indicated 
Russian as their mother tongue in comparison to 6.6 percent who indicated Belarusian 
as their mother tongue.154 According to this data, the author concluded that Belarusian 
language served as a “badge of ethnicity” rather than a practical language since Belarus-
ians overwhelmingly used Russian as their mother tongue. It is worth mentioning that 
independent sociologists in 2006 have concluded that surveys are no longer possible to 
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conduct due to poor conditions that the state has created for the recording of opinions.155 
Thus, the previously mentioned data from 2005 appears to be more reliable for this re-
search than if it had been generated after 2006. 
 The nation-building process, however, is not an official/governmental process 
only; the role of intelligentsia, national and cultural elites is also recognized as an im-
portant factor in nation’s self-imagination and self-determination. Thus, it would also be 
worth analyzing opinions of the Belarusian elites; however, a study from 2006 conclud-
ed that Belarusian elites together with the counter-elites had only started to look for an-
swers to questions about where and whom Belarusians should be.156 In this regard, 
when Belarusian elites are weak in terms of defining the nation-building process, it 
seems that the government can occupy the primary role of defining one in their place. In 
2010, however, Belarusian researcher Yuliya Chernyavskaya concluded that Belarus-
ians have already completed the transformation from identifying themselves as locals 
(тутэйшасць) to the point where they started identifying themselves as being Belarus-
ians.157 Her conclusion was drawn from the idea that the concept of “тутэйшасць,” 
which described the locality of the peasant as his homeland, had given way to describ-
ing Belarus as the homeland. It would be hard to see the role of the government in facil-
itation of such understanding; however, it seems that Belarusian symbols and govern-
ment’s post-2002 rhetoric played a significant role in developing Belarusian under-
standing of self-identification within the region. Furthermore, the government played a 
role of mediator between the idea of Belarus’s sovereignty and independency, and peo-
ple’s imagination of being Belarusian. 
 Also, Chernyavskaya concluded that, paradoxically, people (online bloggers in 
particular) thought about being a part of unified Europe, with self-identification as 
“тутэйшасць” - being reserved, mentally “separated,” or principally detached from 
other regional nationalities.158 Such identification, according to her, creates an obstacle 
for Belarus on its way to becoming a part of unified Europe.159 In this regard, it is rea-
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156 Ibid., 22. 
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sonable to think about the European Union (EU) and Europe in general as an influenc-
ing factor in the Belarusian identity development process. 
 Indeed, in 2009 Belarus became a part of the Eastern Partnership initiative of the 
EU within the European Neighborhood Policy. In terms of this initiative, the EU’s assis-
tance focuses on supporting the needs of the population, directly and indirectly support-
ing democratization and mitigating the effects of the self-isolation of Belarus and its 
society.160 During the Vilnius Summit in November 2013 it was agreed that Belarus will 
continue negotiation with the EU on a visa liberalization program; however, the situa-
tion has not yet improved. Notwithstanding, Belarus-EU relations support the alterna-
tive national narrative’s claims of Belarus’s historical ties with Europe. As long as the 
formal cooperation with the EU persists, it is possible to claim that Belarus and its soci-
ety are being subjected to the EU’s support of the alternative national narrative that ex-
ists in Belarus. The EU-Belarus bilateral cooperation, however, has been developing 
only “on paper” rather than in terms of actually achieved results. Nowadays, Belarus 
participates in the Eastern Partnership only in its multilateral track rather than directly 
with the EU.161 Thus, in terms the European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partner-
ship initiative, Belarus remains outside the main EU’s cooperation policies that are di-
rected at establishing closer dialogue with Belarus. The existing situation, on the other 
hand, may signal that the official national narrative in Belarus continues to see its pro-
Russian direction as more important than pro-European in defining Belarus’s identity. 
 In the post-2002 period, when the official regime started recognizing the influ-
ence that Belarus’s medieval past had on the modern state of Belarus, expressions of the 
alternative national narrative started to find support in various public initiatives in Bela-
rus. In 2009 the local administration of the city of Navahrudak proposed to erect a mon-
ument to the creator of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - king Mindaugas. The Ministry 
of Culture of Belarus supported the idea in 2012, but the initiative has remained on the 
level of intentions. Nevertheless, the memory of Mindaugas in Navahrudak is recog-
nized by the “Mindaugas’ Hill” where his body is buried according to the legend.162 
Even though there are no monuments of king Mindaugas, some other monuments had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 European External Action Service, www.eeac.europa.eu, EU Around the Globe, Belarus, available: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/belarus/index_en.htm 
161 Ibid. 
162 Экскурсии по Беларуси, www.ekskursii.by, Гора Миндовга, available: 
http://www.ekskursii.by/?exkursobj=2576 
60 
	  
been erected. For example, a monument of Vytautas stands in the city of Grodno; in 
2010 another monument to Vytautas was opened in the village Pelesa, Grodno Oblast’. 
A monument to Grand Duke Gediminas was proposed to be erected in the city of Lida 
that is also located in Grodno Oblast’. Despite such public and local initiatives, they 
lack governmental support in financial terms. Even though the government and minis-
tries support such initiatives, they often tend to postpone the actual financing of monu-
ments as in Navahrudak.163 
 The most symbolic break with the pre-2002 official narrative, however, is seen 
in the city of Grodno where a commemorative composition is scheduled for construc-
tion on the place where a Catholic Church, built by the order of the Grand Duke Vytau-
tas, was destroyed by the Communist regime on November 29, 1961.164 In this regard, 
such an initiative goes against the official pre-2002 narrative of favoring Soviet period. 
As occurred following the discovery of mass graves in Belarus in 1988, the Soviet re-
gime is condemned for destruction of Belarusian pre-Soviet national heritage. The post-
2002 national narrative, therefore, includes intentions to rebuild the pre-Soviet architec-
ture thus supporting the alternative narrative of Belarus’s historical connection with Eu-
rope. 
 Similar intentions are represented in private initiatives to preserve visual 
memory of pre-Soviet architecture in Belarus. The webpage Belarusian Globe seeks to 
preserve architectural and other landmarks of Belarus. Its primary goal is to collect pic-
tures of all pre-1917 landmarks for Eastern Belarus, and pre-1939 landmarks for West-
ern Belarus.165 In 2011, 10,600 such objects were found and photographed in Belarus. 
The idea of the initiative is to preserve the pre-Soviet heritage of Belarus, thus empha-
sizing the alternative narrative of Belarusian historical past. The initiative, however, re-
fuses to recognize only the Soviet past by accepting the era of the Russian Empire in its 
periodization. Such an idea, even though at odds with the pre-2002 official national nar-
rative, may support the post-2002 national narrative in which the Belarusian pre-Soviet 
heritage is recognized. 
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 In Belarusian public and cyber space even more alternative expressions of the 
Belarusian national narrative may be found. Today, the Internet provides better options 
for unrecognized alternative groups to express their ideas with regard to the Belarusian 
historical narrative. The most visible among such groups is the Litvania community that 
actively promotes the idea of Litvins as the ancient people of Belarus. The Belarusian 
nation, on the other hand, is considered a Russian-created nation that emerged in the 
nineteenth century. Therefore, Litvins and Belarusians are two different nations with 
different meanings.166 Therefore, Litvins and Belarusians are considered two different 
nations in terms of their cultural, historical and mental context, according to the Lit-
vania community. 
 The recreation of the Litvin nation was proclaimed on May 20, 2000 when the 
first Litvin activists signed the Act of Proclamation of the Litvin nation. Litvins are pre-
sented as a liberal nation that stands for inclusion of the Belarus, Ukraine and Russia 
into the European Union. According to their beliefs, Litvins and Belarusians are differ-
ent nations in terms of their cultural, historical and mental context; however, any person 
can become a Litvin if that person experiences the necessity to become one. The Litvin 
nation is considered a liberal, “open nation” with religious, linguistic and national toler-
ance.167 The group’s historical position is that the Old Litva disappeared with the crea-
tion of the Belarus Soviet Socialist Republic and therefore modern Lithuanians were 
able to assign the name “Lithuanians” to themselves. 
 This alternative narrative is based on an interpretation of historical events that is 
closely related to fiction since this narrative is recognized only by Litvins themselves. 
When looking at their official name, however, we see that sometimes the concept of 
Litvins is used in the official national narrative presented in Belarusian history text-
books when referring to inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Even though such 
interpretation should not be treated seriously, it is important for this research to recog-
nize it as an existing alternative narrative to the official national perception of Belarus-
ian historical identity. 
 Despite the existence of visible representations of the alternative national narra-
tive, the Belarus government does not want to go beyond the recognition of the pre-
Soviet past in terms of its influence on Belarusian culture and characteristics. For ex-
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ample, on the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War in 
2005, Francysk Skaryna Avenue was renamed Independence Avenue.168 Thus, the ave-
nue that previously was named for the Belarusian sixteenth-century publisher and en-
lightener was renamed to represent the pro-Soviet narrative of recognition of Soviet 
deeds. It showed that the Soviet values were still treated seriously, especially the Se-
cond World War memory and its sacralization. According to the Belarusian pro-
government analyst Lev Krishtapovich (Лев Криштапович), the past of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania has nothing to do with the Belarusian nation. More precisely, on 
March 15, 2012 the vice president of the Information and Analytics Center under the 
President’s Administration claimed that intentions to claim the existence of Belarusian 
identity from the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania have nothing to do with the 
real process of spiritual strengthening and overall development of Belarus.169 Therefore, 
it is possible to conclude that the process of inclusion of the pre-Soviet past into the of-
ficial national narrative requires broader public debate involving representatives of al-
ternative narratives. This process, nevertheless, does not seem feasible in the near future 
due to the undemocratic character of the present Belarusian government. 
 Alyaksandr Lukashenka, as an undemocratic president, however, has become 
strong in his rhetoric that would exemplify the post-2002 modification of the official 
national narrative. On April 22, 2014 during the state of nation address claimed that sur-
rounding the events in Ukraine, it is necessary to protect their precious value – the inde-
pendence of Belarus.170 This statement goes against the 1995-2002 official narrative 
when Belarusian independence was rather deemphasized, but closer political and eco-
nomic integration with promoted. Therefore, the post-2002 rhetoric of Belarus’s inde-
pendency and sovereignty is also influencing Belarus’s geopolitical choices in terms of 
East or West. On April 22 Lukashenka said claimed that he would not sign the founding 
treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union unless all limitations and exemptions for the free 
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trade regime are concluded.171 Lukashenka claimed that if all limitations on the free 
trade were lifted only in fifteen years after the treaty is signed, then he also would sign 
the treaty only in fifteen years. Therefore, such rhetoric is completely opposite to the 
warm and pro-Russian rhetoric of the late 1990s. This example of changing attitude to-
wards the integration with Russia means that the official national narrative of the 
Lukashenka regime is changing and is also dependent on the domestic discourse over 
the Belarusian nation-building process. 
 This study’s post-2002 Belarusian identity discourse analysis has shown that to-
day there are various expressions of Belarusian identity in the public sphere that can be 
categorized between the official and alternative national narratives. These narratives 
differ in their interpretation over which historical events should be considered founda-
tional events in the development of Belarusian nation. Medieval reenactment groups, 
musical bands, monuments, use of the Belarusian language on national level etc. pro-
mote the alternative national narrative. The official national narrative, on the other hand, 
is promoted via state symbols and state-sponsored historical memory that is visible in 
the example of the “Stalin line” complex. Furthermore, the official narrative is spread 
via the nationalization of Belarusian public space by the government through the ban on 
non-governmental use of words “Belarus” and “nation.” Therefore, the domestic identi-
ty discourse and change in nation-building policies since 1990s has directly affected 
Belarusian political representation within the region. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTESTED HISTORY AND MEMORY 
IN BELARUSIAN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS 
 
The post-Soviet Belarusian nation-building process started after the independent Bela-
rus was proclaimed in 1991. Moreover, it is possible to see patterns of nation-building 
process conducted through public education in modern Belarus similar to the nation-
building experience of the nineteenth-century European states. This chapter focuses on 
history textbooks, which are currently in use in Belarusian public schools with the Rus-
sian as the language of instruction. History textbooks published in years 2009 and 2010 
can be viewed as a product of the Belarusian national project first mentioned by the 
President Lukashenka in 2002 and later implemented through official documents in 
2003-04 and 2006.172 Furthermore, state history textbooks contain the values and stand-
ards of the Belarusian government as outlined in the Educational Standard of the Sub-
ject “World History. History of Belarus” (5-11 grades), and The Concept of Subject 
“World history. History of Belarus.”173 In order to comprehend the essence of the offi-
cial Belarusian national narrative in history textbooks, it is necessary understand these 
documents. 
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The Belarusian National Narrative in Legal Documents 
 
The Republic of Belarus officially recognizes the effects that globalization has on the 
process of the study of history in Belarus.174 This acknowledgment of the internationali-
zation of education shares Andy Green’s assumption that due to the growing effects of 
globalization governments will nevertheless try to promote a country’s national identity 
by recognizing the complexity of multiethnic networks that affected their national iden-
tity.175 Since Belarus coexists in close proximity to regional actors, it is necessary for 
Belarus to emphasize its tolerance and relationships with people of other nationalities. 
The acknowledgment also shares Andy Green’s model of internationalization of educa-
tion due to the interconnectivity of a shared past. Education in Belarus is used as a basis 
for the promotion of nationhood and national consciousness at a time when Belarusian 
nationhood is still under construction. Even though the history subject is called “World 
history. History of Belarus,” this research primarily focuses on the “History of Belarus” 
as a major facilitator of the Belarusian national narrative in schools. 
 Historical education in secondary schools is seen as means for promoting a sov-
ereign Belarusian state, civic consciousness, patriotism and national consciousness 
among the pupils.176 Moreover, historical education is seen as key to historical memory 
and historical consciousness formation. Historical memory promoted by the state insti-
tutions and services appears to be a governmentally mediated memory as it develops 
within a certain society. In the Belarusian case greater attention toward historical educa-
tion highlights its importance to identity formation since education is seen as a promoter 
of civic consciousness and tolerance towards regional nations and cultures for Belarus-
ian pupils. 
 An important aspect of The Concept of Subject “World history. History of Bela-
rus” is the existence of direct intentions to use historical education in the establishment 
and promotion of the official Belarusian national narrative. More precisely, historical 
education forms national identity of Belarusians that is defined as the concrete emotion-
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al-psychological, politico-ideological and cultural composition of personality which re-
veals itself in the process of self-perception and self-identification within the surround-
ing world from the point of view of a representative of Belarusian nation which has 
deep historical roots.177 
 Historical memory in the legal documents is understood as the ability to appre-
ciate the historical traditions of Belarusian people, but defined as all forms of infor-
mation about the events of the past, their time and space, as well as the participants in 
those historical events.178 The inclusion of historical memory among the goals and ob-
jectives of Belarusian historical education is definitely a good incentive; however, the 
theoretical framework of this research showed that both memory and traditions can be 
either constructed or invented for various purposes. This means that the establishment 
of historical memory is a complicated process of national narrative building that re-
quires a dialogue between both state and society in order to produce a satisfactory narra-
tive for the greater part of society that would actually legitimize the narrative itself. In 
the case of Belarus, however, such dialogue is rather infeasible since the government 
tries to secure its authority over the Belarusian state and nation in which the production 
of historical/political memory, as well as the invention of traditions, becomes a biased, 
top-down process reflecting solely the state’s vision of the national narrative and ex-
cluding larger perceptions of alternative Belarusian national narrative promoted by the 
opposition and non-state actors. 
 National consciousness is defined as an awareness of belonging to the modern 
Belarusian nation that is a political nation with the defining principle of the existence of 
a sovereign Belarusian state.179 In the aforementioned definition two concepts are note-
worthy for an understanding of the official national narrative. First, the use of “modern” 
while addressing the Belarusian nation emphasizes the official position of the 
Lukashenka government, which tries to separate the pre-Soviet or even pre-Russian past 
from the medieval past of Belarusian nation. This distinction is necessary for the legiti-
macy of the government as the sole representative of the modern Belarusian nation, 
which, moreover, is a sovereign state. In this regard, the distinct historical roots of Bela-
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rusian nation are less important than the acknowledgment of the present Belarusian na-
tion, which has incorporated various pasts to become modern, independent and sover-
eign in the present. 
In the subject “World history. History of Belarus,” pupils have to cover a broad 
range of social, economic, political, legal and other aspects of the Grand Duchy. Of 
course, the period starts with the understanding of the formation of the Grand Duchy. 
Later, however, it proceeds to the questions related to the formation of Belarusian na-
tionhood. It is important to notice that the Educational Standard is treating the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania separately from the understanding of Belarusian lands. For exam-
ple, such topics as the cultural life of Belarusian lands and “Our region (kray) in the 
mid-thirteenth century and first half of the sixteenth century” are treated independently 
from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.180 Starting with the middle of sixteenth century, 
topics on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania attempt to show its relative independence with 
regard to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On one hand, this points to the exist-
ence of double standards in the official treatment of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but, 
on the other hand, falls into the official approach of emphasizing a distinct past of Bela-
rusian people. 
 The examination of legal documents revealed structural patterns of the official 
Belarusian national narrative that are supposed to be visible in the 2009/2010 Belarus-
ian history textbooks. The contents of the Concept and the Standard of historical educa-
tion in Belarus bear a striking resemblance to the official model of Belarusian national 
narrative. Therefore, it is now possible to focus on the textbooks themselves to evaluate 
the hypothesis whether the Belarusian national narrative is challenging the Lithuanian 
national narrative in Belarusian history textbooks. To make the analysis theoretically 
stronger, however, it is necessary to review the existing research made on Belarusian 
history textbooks in order to have better understanding of possible patterns of Belarus-
ian-Lithuanian representation within the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
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Existing Research on Belarusian History Textbooks 
 
Despite the topicality of Belarusian history in local and regional mass media, there is an 
evident absence of academic research on the narratives of Belarussian history presented 
in Belarusian history textbooks. Every time a new book on Belarusian history is re-
leased it motivates a debate and thus attracts greater attention to the topic of Belarusian 
history and the question of the particular narrative discussed in the book. It seems that 
media analyses, however, are adequate to satisfy the public’s interest in how the Bela-
rusian government and historians interpret the state’s history. Usually, such media ac-
counts address the problem of rewriting Belarusian history in history textbooks in terms 
of their effect on the comprehension of Belarusian history in general.181 Media com-
mentary describing the negative connotations of rewriting of Belarusian history is espe-
cially visible among more independent media such as Charter’97. Also the Russian me-
dia engages in history textbook analysis, usually to portray that Belarusian textbooks 
have interpreted some particular past with positive or negative connotations in regard to 
Russia.182 Such analyses appear negative in addressing Belarusian nationhood and inde-
pendent historical roots. Sometimes media agencies analyze Belarusian history text-
books in terms of a broader discussion of textbooks in the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States (CIS) or textbooks in an even larger region.183 Such examples that incorporate 
the study of regional textbooks, however, show that one nation’s history cannot be 
treated separately from other regional actors and therefore, it is vital to acknowledge 
their presence and possible importance in nation-building. 
 Several scholars have analyzed Belarusian history textbooks in various details. 
Nelly Bekus discusses differences between official and alternative narrations in Bela-
rusian history textbooks in the chapter within her larger research on the Belarusian 
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struggle over identity.184 Her understanding of the Belarusian national narrative is also 
divided into two models of official and alternative. According to her conclusions, the 
main difference between the two models lies in geopolitics and the treatment of Russia 
as the “other” because official narrative sees Russian influence in the region as a posi-
tive aspect for Belarusian nationhood but the presence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
in Belarusian history – as negative. The alternative narrative sees both periods in oppo-
sition highlighting the Grand Duchy and diminishing the Russian influence.185 
 Even though Nelly Bekus incorporates some of the official textbooks in her 
comparative analysis, her goal is not to research the textbooks per se, but rather to com-
pare official historical narration in textbooks with more alternative interpretations in 
non-governmental publishing. This approach is different from the media analyses since 
media agencies try to use a diachronic approach and analyze different textbooks’ inter-
pretations taken from different years. Bekus, however, does not explain her choice of 
textbooks and uses them simply as an example of the official history interpretations. In 
this regard, she uses textbooks from various years – 2000, 2003, 2004 and 2005. All 
textbooks came from the schools or universities with Russian as the language of instruc-
tion and, at the time her book was published, new history textbooks were introduced 
and had already been in use in Belarusian schools. 
 After analyzing two historical narratives presented in official textbooks and 
books on Belarusian history in free circulation, Nelly Bekus concluded: “Historical dis-
courses serve as a basis for a certain concept of Belarusianness; formulations and defini-
tions of this concept can be found in political discourses, where the national idea is ar-
ticulated on the material of historical presentations of the Belarusian past.”186 According 
to Bekus, the official narrative presented in history textbooks is a part of political dis-
course that, in the end, is able to produce a certain understanding of what “Belarusian-
ness” means for Belarusians. The work extracts the official narrative from the textbooks 
and puts it into the larger discussion of “Belarusianness” that exists in the Belarusian 
public sphere. 
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In contrast from Bekus’s approach, Belarussian researcher Tatyana Ostrovskaya 
compares different historical narratives and interpretations within Belarusian history 
textbooks in order to better see the change of narratives according to particular periods 
since 1991. Ostrovskaya analyzes Belarusian history textbooks published from 1993 to 
2009 in order to overview the basic phases of (re)construction of national historical 
memory within the boundaries of the education system, with its possible influence on 
national identification.187 Among the outcomes of her research, Ostrovskaya identifies 
three distinct periods in history textbooks where the narrative of textbooks significantly 
changed. The first period of 1993 – 1995 she called an anti-colonial period during 
which the process of deconstruction of Soviet/colonial myths took place. The second 
period began in 1996 soon after President Lukashenka took his office and ended in 2001 
when the President’s office reconsidered its national policies. This period was character-
ized by an increasing struggle with the existing national project of that time. The third 
period started with 2002 and concluded with the end of her research in 2009, and is 
marked by the intentions of Lukashenka’s government to construct a new history, i.e. a 
new national idea.188 
 The third period is of the most significant interest not only for the present-day 
nation-building policies of Belarus but also for this research in particular. Ostrovskaya 
claims that the period started with Lukashenka’s speech in 2002 when he claimed that a 
national idea should be developed, but that the Belarusian nation was not fully ready for 
that.189 Undoubtedly, the claim by Lukashenka is important, however, there was another 
reason for Lukashenka’s change in mind. Just before Lukashenka’s speech in the sum-
mer of 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented on the prospect of Russian 
and Belarusian unification into one state; he said that the only feasible route would be 
the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation.190 Prior to this statement, 
Lukashenka had hoped for better conditions if Belarus and Russia were to merge into a 
single union. It is conceivable that after the summer of 2002 Lukashenka saw Belarus-
ian sovereignty as a sole guarantee of his power and security, and thus changed his poli-
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cies in order to maintain Belarusian statehood and sovereignty.191 A strong Belarusian 
nation, however, was needed to maintain Belarusian integrity at that time. It meant that 
national idea of Belarus would be able to unite people around their independent and 
sovereign state without intending of unification with Russia in any possible form. 
 The third period outlined by Ostrovskaya started in 2002. Now, Belarusians 
started to be characterized as Slavs, West-Russians and as Russian in general.192 In con-
trast with the second period, the post-2002 narrative has been characterized by the inten-
tions of historians to accumulate pre-Soviet events of Belarusian history, establish a 
Belarusian ancient past, as well as find deeper roots of Belarusian statehood.193 Post-
2002 textbooks, however, do not provide clear answers and representations of “Belarus-
ianness.” Only a clear connotation of state ideology gets incorporated into the text-
books, claims Ostrovskaya.194 
 The most important conclusion in regard to this research is Ostrovskaya’s obser-
vation that the narrative of Lithuanians in Belarusian history textbooks is presented 
without a clear evaluation – they are neither criticized nor described in general. It is em-
phasized, however, that during the period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the Balts 
occupied a lower level of development than the Slavs.195 Even though this conclusion is 
valuable for my research, it does not shed light on the intentions of Belarusian history 
textbooks to “rewrite” the Lithuanian past. Furthermore it is hard to say whether the 
Belarusian national narrative is somehow contesting the Lithuanian one. 
Notwithstanding the use of the same history textbooks as I do in this research, 
Ostrovskaya does not focus on Belarus-Lithuania narrative during the period of the 
Grand Duchy. Therefore, this research is able to complement the existing research on 
Belarusian history textbooks. In particular, it provides a greater understanding of how 
Belarusian national narrative is trying to promote the creation of the Belarusian national 
idea on the particular example of Belarus-Lithuania relations during the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. Now it is necessary to turn to the overview of the research itself. 
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Construction of the Official Belarusian National Narrative in Belarusian 
History Textbooks 
 
In the period from 1995 until 2002 the inception of the Belarusian nation was linked 
with the first appearance of Slavic tribes in Belarusian lands. Belarusians were defined 
as Slavs, as West-Russians and, in the end, as Russians.196 Different interpretations still 
existed due to the lack of conceptual uniformity in Belarusian textbooks. Nevertheless, 
the official national narrative resembled the narrative, which existed during the Soviet 
era. In the post-2002 textbooks, the rehabilitation of the pre-Soviet and pre-Russian his-
tory topics of the Belarusian past becomes visible. This period marks the incentives to 
historicize the Belarusian nation together with an emphasis of the deep historical roots 
of Belarusian nationhood.197 
 History textbooks from 2009/2010 continue the idea of Belarusian nation’s an-
tiquity together with further interpretation of Belarusian ancestry. First of all, it is said 
that all Belarusian lands belonged to an Old Russian state with the capital in Kiev. It is 
also said, however, that Kievan Rus’ was a common state of the so-called Eastern 
Slavs.198 This narrative of Eastern Slavs is extremely important and appears to be a new 
interpretation of the deep roots of Belarusian nation. On the one hand, Eastern Slavs are 
not precisely Russians which leaves place for more distinct Belarusianness, but on the 
other hand, they are Slavs nonetheless. Such an interpretation combines Belarusians 
with other Slavic nationalities such as Russian and Ukrainian. 
 The sixth grade textbook provides a scientific explanation behind the Eastern 
Slavic community of the Kievan state claiming that Eastern Slavic tribes had a lot of 
things in common, such as language, territory of habitation, culture etc. Furthermore, 
such a community is sometimes called an Old-Russian nation (друвнерусская народ-
ность), which became a common source for all three nations – Belarusian, Russian and 
Ukrainian.199 In this regard, there are two crucial concepts for understanding the modern 
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Belarussian interpretation of its nation’s antiquity – Eastern Slavic tribes and a common 
Old-Russian nation. 
 More than that, the main common denominator for the Old-Russian nation was 
language. The textbook mentions that such old-Russian sources as chronicles and sto-
ries testify that Eastern Slavs had one literary language.200 This implies that ancestors of 
modern Belarusian, Russians and Ukrainians spoke one language. At least on one occa-
sion, textbooks mention that already in the medieval period some people spoke Belarus-
ian.201 This is a strong conclusion for the textbook; however, it acknowledges that spo-
ken languages differed among the people due to the great territorial spread of Eastern 
Slavic habitation. 
 The seventh grade history textbook continues the national narrative of Belarus-
ians belonging to Eastern Slavs. More precisely, the authors claim: “If Kievan Rus’ is 
called the cradle of Belarusian people, then the Grand Duchy of Lithuania marked the 
adulthood of Belarus.”202 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is mentioned as a political en-
tity where the Belarusian nation had been formed. Furthermore, Eastern Slavs – the an-
cestors of Belarusian and Ukrainians – became the ethnic core of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania.203 Thus, Belarusian textbooks recognize connections to Old-Russian nation, 
at the same time emphasizing Belarus’s different path that it took in the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania where the Belarusian nation had been formed. The period of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania appears as the time when Old-Russian Belarusian nation emerges as dis-
tinct from the Ukrainian and Russian nations. 
 The creation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania marked the development of the 
main characteristics of Belarusian culture and its character, such as multi-
confessionalism, religious and national tolerance, respect for various customs and cul-
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tures, traditions of neighbors and openness.204 Thus, Belarusian textbooks from 
2009/2010 precisely reflect the concepts and standards developed by the Ministry of 
Education of the Republic of Belarus where a strong emphasis is put on Belarusian tol-
erance, respect for other cultures and nations. Textbooks propagate a narrative of histor-
ical continuity with the national values and virtues of the Belarusian nation that are out-
lined in Belarusian official documents. 
 A certain level of continuity with the present appears in the textbook when the 
authors claim that “[Belarusian people] gathered strength in order to survive and appear 
in front of the world with its own history – heroic and sometimes dramatic.”205 It cer-
tainly empowers the modern Belarusian nation as a nation with a distinct historical past 
where tragedies and hardships tempered its people. Once again, the Belarusian nation’s 
development did not divert from the other East Slavs. During the Slavic colonization of 
the Belarusian lands, for example, Belarusian cities were built that led to the emergence 
of such historically important centers as Navahrudak, Grodno, and Volkovisskoe, which 
played an important role in the development of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.206 
 Later, in the fourteenth century the narrative claims that Eastern Slavic lands 
were united under the rule of Grand Duke Gediminas (1315/16-1345). It is also said that 
the population of Belarusian lands retained their former way of living, language and 
culture after the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been created and therefore, it had not 
been “colonized” by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Furthermore, the highest authorities 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not intervene into the domestic affairs of Eastern 
Slavs.207 Such an interpretation is meant to show the relative autonomy of Eastern Slavs 
within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by emphasizing the idea that Belarusians were in-
dependent from Lithuanians and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in general. Such an idea 
is also stressed by claims that Belarusian language became an official language of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania with high rate of distribution and high percentage of popula-
tion who considered themselves “Russian” – the description of Belarusians used in the 
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medieval period.208 In addition, under the influence of the Belarusian people some parts 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania accepted Orthodoxy; among them were the Grand 
Duke Gediminas and his children. 
 Therefore, it seems that Belarusian history textbooks emphasize the “Belarus-
ianness” of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but at the same time the official national nar-
rative tends to distance itself from the importance of the Grand Duchy in Belarus’s 
modern identity. Thus, a contradiction is visible between the narrative presented in his-
tory textbooks and the official national narrative promoted by the government in Bela-
rus’s public sphere. On one hand, it seems logical for the nation-building process to 
emphasize the deep historical roots of Belarus and the “Belarusianness” of the Grand 
Duchy overall, however, it seems counterintuitive that the process of stressing Belarus’s 
medieval past is not continued in Belarusian public sphere and by the government itself. 
 There is a strong emphasis in Belarusian history textbooks of the narrative of 
relative Belarusian self-sufficiency in the medieval period together with the idea that the 
Belarusian people contributed the most to the development of the Grand Duchy of Lith-
uania overall. Such emphasis on Belarusianness, however, is mixed with idea that the 
“Russian” people also populated the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The question remains 
why the textbooks continue mentioning the Russian nation within the context of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania if they claim that “Russian” was a name for “Belarusian” at 
that time. It gets even more complicated when the textbooks claim that the maintenance 
of “Russian” lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was dependent on satisfaction 
of the interests of Belarusian and Ukrainian lords.209 Thus, it seems that there is a con-
stant mixture between the Russian and Belarusians in explaining their role within the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its development. This device is used, however, to em-
phasize Belarusian historical ties to Eastern Slavic tribes and thus their connection to 
the modern Russian and Ukrainian nations. 
 In the textbooks, the Baltic tribes are mentioned as neighbors of Eastern Slavs 
with a long history of cohabitation. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania is mentioned as a 
common state of the Baltic and the Eastern Slavic tribes, and their interrelations are also 
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portrayed in the textbooks. After outlining the official Belarusian national narrative as it 
appears in Belarusian history textbooks, it is worth focusing on the representation of 
Lithuanians in the same textbooks since it is the main Baltic nation whose ancestors 
shared the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 
 
Representation of Lithuania within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 
Belarusian History Textbooks 
 
This textbook analysis is more like a caesura of Lithuanian representation in Belarusian 
textbooks at a particular time rather than an attempt to provide a larger examination of 
Belarusian treatment of Lithuania in its textbooks. As evident in the existing research, 
Belarusian narratives in history textbooks are subject to change based on particular re-
gimes or nation-building policies of the state. Thus, the following research is an attempt 
to see the Belarusian national narrative within the context of 2002-2009 period defined 
by Tatyana Ostrovskaya in her research. 
 The sixth-grade history textbook provides a clear narrative with regard to repre-
sentation of Lithuanians during the origins of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Looking at 
the linguistic connotation of sentences used to address Lithuanians, however, it is possi-
ble to claim that Lithuanians are treated as less developed tribes. For example, the text 
reports that agriculture and the political level of development of Belarusian lands was 
higher than in Lithuanian lands. It also says that Baltic tribes until the thirteenth century 
had neither cities nor writing, but they experienced separation between the nobility and 
common people, i.e. feudalism.210 Furthermore, the narrative of the creation of Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania is the one of gradual and peaceful unification rather than a narrative 
of conquest by Lithuanian dukes.211 
 Overall the text suggests a lack of written documentation about the Belarusian 
neighbors in the North-West. Although the textbook acknowledges that Lithuania was 
first mentioned in 1009, it claims that it is not precisely clear what this name meant and 
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where it came from.212 In the thirteenth century, however, a group of Baltic tribes 
neighboring Belarusian lands had already united and started to call themselves “Aukštai-
ti,” while a second similar union started to be called “Žemaiti.” Moreover, they had 
come very close to establishing their own state.213 This distinction in Belarusian history 
textbooks is crucial in understanding how the Belarusian narrative is describing present-
day Lithuania – as descendants from Aukštaitija rather than from the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania. 
 The seventh-grade history textbook, focusing on the first half of thirteenth cen-
tury until the first half of sixteenth century devotes greater attention to Lithuania as a 
separate nation because it is precisely the time when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had 
been formed. For that matter, the textbook claims that the political union of two nation-
alities – Lithuanian and Belarusian – formed the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.214 Further-
more, a very close nexus existed between the two nations that allowed them to develop 
a common state with the political center located in the city of Navahrudak and neighbor-
ing Lithuanian lands.215 
 Despite the fact that the existence of a separate Lithuanian nation is recognized, 
its importance in the creation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is not clearly defined in 
the textbooks. For example, due to the later acquisition of Ukrainian lands the Duchy 
was named “the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia.” But later, with the acquisition 
of Žemaitija, it started to be called “the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Russia and 
Žemaitija.”216 A narrative that Lithuanians are descendants from Aukštaitija is support-
ed also in this textbook claiming that Lithuania was a separate region within Aukštaitija 
and a center of unification of the Baltic tribes. Later, all parts of Aukštaitija and even 
some parts of Žemaitija started to be called Lithuania.217 Furthermore, due to the gradu-
al colonization of the region by the Slavs, not only the Baltic people populated 
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Aukštaitija. Eventually it led to the dependency of Lithuanian lands on Russian mon-
archs who would collect taxes and exercise their power over Lithuanian lands.218 
 The narrative of underdevelopment among the Baltic tribes continues through 
descriptions of the Slavic lands as more developed since they had bigger cities, had 
more advanced crafts, traditions and state organization.219 Moreover, the Baltic tribes 
entered the period of organizing their statehood only in the twelfth-thirteenth century, 
which explained their increasing militancy. A more critical explanation of Lithuanian 
society is also given in the claim that by the thirteenth century an undeveloped form of 
slavery existed there due to division on nobles and common people.220 This did not pre-
vent the Grand Duchy, however, from becoming an independent power within the re-
gion that would challenge Muscovites, Poles and German invaders. 
The establishment of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is directly connected with 
the expansion Mindaugas’s lands to Belarusian lands, including the important city of 
Navahrudak. King Mindaugas is an important character in the history of Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania with whom the beginnings of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are connect-
ed.221 According to the textbook, Mindaugas accepted the Catholic faith in order to be-
come the king of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1253. In 1261, however, he gave up 
the Catholic faith and turned back to paganism which is also proven by claims that 
Mindaugas secretly burned the bodies of his enemies to please the gods, etc.222 It is pos-
sible that by projecting Mundaugas’s faith as not entirely Catholic, Belarusian textbooks 
are leaving space to interpret him as not precisely the Catholic or pagan king but rather 
as the king who might have also adopted the Orthodox faith instead of Catholicism. 
 So far, the representation of Lithuanians is mixed – neutral or rather negative. 
The Belarusian narrative in the seventh-grade textbook portrays Lithuanians as capable 
of uniting the lands and being militarily superior to the extent that some Belarusian 
lands would even ask Lithuanian rulers to be accepted under their protection due to the 
level of military organization the Lithuanians had.223 When talking about the Grand 
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Duchy of Lithuania as a political entity, however, the narrative seems to diminish the 
“Lithuanianness” of the Grand Duchy by showing that the Slavic language and culture 
had greater importance than that of the Baltic tribes. For example, the text claimed that 
the Belarusian language had high rates of distribution and became the official language 
of the state; therefore, almost ¾ of the population called themselves “Russians” (“Русь-
скими”). Such claims support the official narrative that Belarusians of that time were 
called Russians.224 
 The textbook’s narrative does not only diminish the Lithuanians importance in 
that period but also seeks to enhance and empower the Belarusianness and Russianness 
of the Duchy, giving examples that king Gediminas would call himself “the king of 
Lithuania and Rus’” or “the king of Lithuanians and many Russians.”225 Or, that in or-
der to keep the “Russian” lands within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, it was necessary 
to meet the interests of Belarusian and Ukrainian lords.226 Thus, Belarusian history text-
books refer to the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as being mainly Russian 
with certain Belarusian aspects such as culture and language. Belarusian history text-
books, therefore, claim that Belarusians in the medieval period were called Russians 
due to close intermingling of Eastern Slavic tribes. 
 The aforementioned interpretations show interdependency among the Balts and 
the Slavs of that period by depicting the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a product of both 
Baltic and Slavic tribes. The presence of “Russian” is not always understandable and 
means that the textbook’s narrative is deliberately using the interpretations of Russian-
ness to claim that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a multifaceted creation where 
Eastern Slavs were Belarusians but the Belarusians, however, were sometimes called 
“Russians.” At the same time, there are intentions to diminish the role of the Lithuanian 
nation in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania by claiming that Lithuania and the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania were two separate entities. More precisely, Lithuanian and Belarus-
ian lands united in order to establish a common state, which was not a product of only 
one side’s intentions. Such an interpretation is portrayed in an illustration from the text-
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book where separate names are given for the Lithuanian lands, the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania lands and the Belarusian lands (see below). 
Illustration Nr. 4.1 
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in second half of XII – first half of XIV centuries 
 
Source: История Беларуси вторая половина XIII – первая половина XVI в. Учебное пособие для 7 
класса общеобразовательных учреждений с русским языком обучения под редакцией Ю.Н. Боха-
на. (Минск «Народная асвета» 2009), 17 
 As seen on the map, a separate name is given for Lithuanians lands (Литва), a 
separate name for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania lands (Великое Княжество Литов-
ское) and a separate name for the Belarusian lands (Русь). Such a representation sug-
gests that the Grand Duchy as something alienated from Lithuanian and Belarusian his-
tories. It seems that Belarusian interpretation asserts the Grand Duchy as something in-
dependent from both histories without emphasizing any nation’s importance. For exam-
ple, neither of the Grand Dukes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Grand Duke Gedimi-
nas, Vytautas and king Mindaugas) is given any nationality in Belarusian textbooks; 
they are seen as rulers of the Grand Duchy rather than representatives of Baltic or East-
Slavic nationalities. Moreover, the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy were called “Litvins” 
to emphasize their belonging to a particular political entity of the medieval period rather 
81 
	  
than a separate twenty-first century state.227 Maybe exactly for that reason Belarusian 
history textbooks do not emphasize the Grunwald battle of 1410, simply saying that 
there was a war with the Teutonic Order from 1409 until 1411.228 Such silencing of a 
particular event that has a glorious meaning in Lithuania might be seen as an attempt to 
refrain from empowering Lithuanian national narrative. 
 This research has shown that there is a lack of focused orientation on the image 
of Lithuanian nation and its overall representation in Belarusian history textbooks. Lith-
uanians are mostly mentioned in connection with Belarusians as co-creators of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. When the Lithuanian nation is mentioned, however, there is 
a deliberate tendency to represent it as originating from less developed tribes in compar-
ison to Eastern Slavic tribes. Thus, even though Lithuanians are represented, it is done 
to show their underdevelopment in social and cultural matters rather than their historical 
importance. Their militancy, however, is emphasized in positive terms to portray it as a 
reason for the Belarusian lands to seek protection from Lithuanian forces against exter-
nal threats such as that posed by the German crusaders. 
 The fact that Belarusian history textbooks tend to diminish Lithuanian represen-
tation and importance seems logical due to the significance of education in the nation-
building process that was outlined in the theoretical framework for this research. De-
spite different interpretations of Lithuanian input into the creation and maintenance of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian narrative tends to emphasize the Belarus-
ianness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania where possible, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, rather than to purposefully “rewrite” Lithuanian history of that period. In this 
regard, combining Belarusian representation and Lithuanian representation in Belarus-
ian history textbooks, it is possible to draw certain general conclusions about patterns of 
interpretations used in the Belarusian history textbooks under analysis.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Even though having only one major research question, this Master’s thesis has provided 
answers to several broader questions regarding Belarus’s post-1991 nation-building 
process. First of all, by its very existence this research contested the point that Belarus is 
a “denationalized” nation that failed to produce a consolidated nation after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The research indicated that the process of consolidation of the Belarusian 
nation has developed later than after 1991 due to the complicated domestic configura-
tions, which existed before 2002 and partially, continue to exists now. Therefore, Bela-
rus should not be considered the “denationalized” state, but a state with rather compli-
cated national identity that is divided between the expressions of the official and the al-
ternative national narratives in Belarus’s public sphere. In recent years, however, with 
the strong influence of the official narrative and government’s nation-building policies, 
the Belarus’s identity has consolidated and is able to represent a nation. 
Therefore, previous studies on various expressions of Belarusian nationalism 
should be re-conceptualized due to the changing policies of the Belarus’s nation-
building process. More precisely, the official Belarusian national discourse does not re-
semble pro-Russian vector anymore but rather focuses on re-consideration of the histor-
ical “Belarusianness” putting emphasis on historical aspects and qualities of the Bela-
rusian people rather than on the importance of historical political formations. Official 
discourse wants to promote the concept of sovereign and modern Belarusian nation that 
is the product of the complicated nation-building process, which, in turn, started with 
the identity-formation in medieval times and continued with the political development 
of the state during the Soviet period. Nowadays it is the process of merge between the 
pre-Russian and the medieval characteristics and the Soviet-era state formation of Bela-
rus. 
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Also, this thesis signifies that the existing research on Belarusian history text-
books does not clearly interpret the idea of Belarusian nationhood, claiming that history 
textbooks simply started looking for Belarusian antiquity. This particular research, on 
the other hand, shows that Belarusian textbooks started combining the alternative na-
tional narrative of the distinct pre-Soviet roots of Belarusian nation together with the 
acknowledgement of the official pro-Russian national narrative that the Belarusian na-
tion’s roots belong to Eastern Slavic people who are closely related to the other Slavic 
nations of Russia and Ukraine. 
 In general, the overview of the post-1991 nation-building process has revealed 
the interconnection between the change of the domestic nation-building narratives and 
the change in foreign policy choices in terms of Belarus’s self-identification within the 
region. Therefore, the period from 1991 until 1994 marked Belarus’s orientation to-
wards the West rather than Russia due to the strong ethnocentric nationalism expressed 
by the Belarusian Popular Front in early 1990s. Negation of the Soviet past shaped Bel-
arus’s orientation to the opposite side from Russia. 
 After 1994, however, the pro-Western orientation was substituted with an in-
creasingly close political and economic integration with Russia. In series of referenda, 
Belarus’s pre-Soviet symbols where changed to the flag and the coat of arms that em-
phasized its direct relation to the Soviet values. In the period from 1994 until 2002 Bel-
arus was extremely interested in strengthening its ties with Russia disregarding the pre-
1994 connections with the West. The Belarusian rhetoric towards the West, however, 
had changed remarkably since 2002 and allowed Belarus to become a part of European 
Neighborhood Policy in 2004. Later in 2009 Belarus became a part of the Eastern Part-
nership of the European Union. Even though there is a lack of bilateral cooperation be-
tween the two actors that is also marked by the European Union sanctions towards Bela-
rus nowadays, the presence of the official and the alternative national narratives has al-
lowed Belarus to reconsider its position and partners within the region. 
 Nowadays, it is concluded that with the stress on Belarus’s independence and 
sovereignty in its domestic national rhetoric, Belarus conducts rather independent and 
pragmatic foreign policy in terms of its alignment with the West of with the Russian 
Federation. The Belarus-EU relations are slow and largely depend on Belarus’s willing 
to cooperate further, primarily in non-economic questions. The Belarus-Russia rela-
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tions, on the other hand, are conducted with the pragmatic idea of Belarus’s benefits. 
Despite the fact that Belarus continues to connect itself with Russia historically, the pre-
sent political and economic connection develops via the multilateral network rather than 
bilateral integration. This attitude is revealed in the process of creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, in which Lukashenka stated that Belarus needs clear economic bene-
fits from the Union rather than the sole symbolism of its premature creation in 2015. 
 The aforementioned connections between the domestic nation-building narra-
tives and Belarus’s self-identification within the region have revealed the far-reaching 
implications of the nation-building process in Belarus. It is enlightening to see how par-
ticular national narratives relate not only to the domestic configurations within the state, 
but also directly influence country’s foreign policy choices. 
In terms of the research aim, this Master’s thesis has completely fulfilled the aim 
and did its best in understanding the Belarus’s nation-building process. This research 
has revealed the existence of two national narratives in the Belarus’s public sphere that 
appeal to different values and different periods of the Belarus’s history. This research 
has defined the official and the alternative national narratives as the most persistent nar-
ratives in Belarus’s public sphere. The official national narrative should be seen as the 
government’s product because it is revealed in the official campaigns, rhetoric as well 
as in the system of education. The alternative national narrative, on the other hand, rep-
resents various ideas and narratives, which do not comply with the officially promoted 
history, memory and national values of the modern state. Therefore, in line with the ex-
istence of the two narratives, the Belarus’s history textbooks possess the values and ide-
as of the official national narrative. 
 The main question of this research was centered on the problem of the represen-
tation of Lithuania and Lithuanians in Belarus’s history textbooks. In line with the re-
search question, the first hypothesis of the Master’s thesis was defined as following: the 
Belarusian national narrative in history textbooks does not challenge the Lithuanian na-
tional narrative, but seeks to highlight and empower the “Belarusianness” of their 
shared past for the nation-building purposes. After the conducted research it is possible 
to conclude that this hypothesis appears to be partially falls because with the process of 
empowering the “Belarusianness” and the emphasis on the supremacy of the Belarusian 
lands in comparison to the Lithuanian lands, the history textbooks do challenge the 
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Lithuanian national narrative by diminishing their historical significance in the period 
that is considered “glorious” in Lithuania. The history textbooks’ narrative, however, 
does not seek to “rewrite” the Lithuanian past because it should be seen as an outcome 
of the complicated nation-building process, in which there is no unanimity on the value 
of Belarus’s medieval past. 
 Belarusian history textbooks tend to promote Belarusian national identity to-
gether with tolerance towards other regional identities and cultures. Therefore, it is con-
cluded that the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is presented as a complex pro-
cess of Belarusian and Lithuanian cooperation that in the middle of thirteenth century 
produced an independent political entity. The image of Lithuanian nation, however, is 
presented as being underdeveloped in comparison to their East-Slavic neighbors or neu-
tral when it comes to general perception of Baltic tribes and their role in the develop-
ment of a common state. 
The thesis concludes that the Belarusian history textbooks seek to portray the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania as an independent medieval political entity that is detached 
from the modern political entities of Belarus and Lithuania. Despite the role the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania played in developing a Belarusian nation, nothing is clearly stated 
about the importance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the establishment of the Lith-
uanian nation. In support of the idea, the history textbooks claim that the “Litvins” - a 
sort of a separate nation of the medieval state - populated the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and neither the Lithuanians nor the Belarusians. The narrative of “Litvins,” however, is 
not the main concern of the textbooks; it is more promoted by individual scholars.229 It 
is said that Litvins were the inhabitants of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, but the text-
book also say that the Baltic tribes – Lithuanians, the Eastern Slavic people – Belarus-
ians, Russians, and Ukrainians lived in the Grand Duchy and made its core population. 
It means that also the Lithuanians are considered to be the Litvins, however, such argu-
ment is not clearly emphasized due to the peculiarities of the official national narrative 
of Belarus. In general, history textbooks have tendency to silence and empower certain 
interpretations and events of the past. Therefore, it might be concluded that the Litvin 
narrative is not emphasized in the textbooks because it stands as clearly alternative Na-
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tivist narrative to the pro-Russian official national narrative. With no direct intentions to 
challenge the Lithuanian past, Belarusian textbooks empower Belarusian narrative for 
the purposes of modern nation-building, as well as for the purposes of finding deep his-
torical roots of the Belarusian nation which is relevant for the 2002-2009 period out-
lined by Tatyana Ostrovskaya in her research. 
 This Master’s thesis, however, has revealed an interesting connection between 
the official national narrative that is promoted in Belarus’s public sphere and the narra-
tive with regard to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Belarus’s history textbooks. It has 
been discussed in the thesis that the official national narrative tends to distance itself 
from the Belarus’s medieval past claiming that it does not fully represent the values of 
the modern Belarusian state. The narrative in the history textbooks, however, is contra-
dicting the official narrative in terms of its emphasis on the “Belarusianness” of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The history textbooks emphasize the supremacy of the Bela-
rusian lands over the Baltic lands and claim that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was sub-
jected to strong influence of the Belarusian people and the Belarusian language. There-
fore, future researches might ask the question why the official national narrative is dis-
tancing itself from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its historical influence on the 
modern Belarus’s state, but the history textbooks, in turn, emphasize the presence and 
influence of Belarus and its culture on the medieval political entity. Thus, it is possible 
to conclude that there is a lack of harmonization between the official national narrative 
and its expressions in the history textbooks. 
 The existence of this contradiction between the official national narrative and 
the history textbooks’ narrative is very interesting because the narrative of Belarusian 
history textbooks itself is extremely contested within Belarus and among the Belarusian 
scholars. There is an ongoing debate about the problem of “rewriting” of the Belarusian 
history with regard to medieval ages and twentieth century history. The problem with 
medieval period is that Belarusian textbooks are accused in silencing Belarusian roots 
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, i.e. not interpreting enough to emphasize the Belarus-
ian deeds. On the other hand, there is a concern that the twentieth century period is be-
ing interpreted to whitewash the Soviet system showing that precisely this period should 
be considered the primary nation-building period of Belarusians. 
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 Nevertheless, the Belarusian national narrative in history textbooks should be 
seen as a product of diverse Belarusian nation-building process that has been develop-
ing since 1991. The national narratives had been changed several times from pro-
European in early 1990s to pro-Soviet in mid-1990s and later to more moderate hybrid 
“Creole” narrative after 2002 that incorporates some aspects of the two previous mod-
els. Under the domestic process of nation-building, the official national narrative incor-
porates certain aspects of the alternative national narrative that makes it reconsider some 
aspects of representation of Belarusian past in the history textbooks. In this regard, the 
Belarusian official national narrative in history textbooks should be treated as an at-
tempt to define the Belarusian national identity rather than to “rewrite” the Lithuanian 
past. Such attempts, however, definitely challenge the Lithuanian national narrative be-
cause they differ in substantial matters about central aspects of Lithuanian past such as 
the place of Coronation of King Mindaugas. 
This research has analyzed a particular example from the Belarusian textbooks 
of the conflicting narratives of the shared Lithuanian and the Belarusian past in order to 
show the changing pattern of the Belarusian national narrative, which is incorporating 
some reasoning of the alternative narrative which exists parallel to the official narrative. 
Therefore, it is also possible to evaluate the second hypothesis for this research, 
which sounds as following: the more the official Belarusian narrative tries to establish a 
Belarusian national idea, the more it resembles the alternative narrative of Belarusian 
opposition. As it was shown throughout this research, the post-2002 official national 
narrative has recognized the influence of Belarus’s medieval past on modern Belarus’s 
identity. It should be concluded that due to the complexity of Belarus’s history and post-
1991 nation-building process, Belarus’s government in 2000s could not longer disregard 
the influence of its medieval past because it was constantly revived by reenactment 
groups, musical bands, public initiatives on erection of monuments etc. 
This particular research indicated that the Belarusian textbooks started combin-
ing the two narratives of distinct historical roots of the Belarusian nation together with 
the acknowledgement of the fact that the Belarusian nation’s roots belong to the Eastern 
Slavic people who are closely related to other Slavic nations of Russia and Ukraine. The 
second hypothesis is therefore supported by the research 
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 The textbooks promote the Belarusian nation as an outgrowth from the Old-
Russian nation that united Belarusians, Russians and Ukrainians in one region. The 
textbooks do not consider it important to mention the nationality of such important his-
torical figures as the King Mindaugas, Great Dukes Gediminas and Vytautas. It means 
that the textbooks see the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as an independent period within 
the history of Belarus that was ruled by relatively independent historical nations who 
also appear to be ancestors of modern regional nations, but not more than that. Moreo-
ver, history textbooks reflect the essence of Belarusian official documents of the Minis-
try of Education of the Republic of Belarus where the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is 
treated as a separate entity that is not a direct ancestor of the modern Belarusian state. 
The official Belarusian national narrative does not stress the importance of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania in its political terms, but rather consider it as a time when Belarus-
ian national consciousness developed in distinctive ways from the Old-Russian nation. 
One might suggest that it is an intention of the Belarus’s state to rewrite the 
Lithuanian past in order to emphasize its national heritage and deep historical roots. 
This assumption, however, is rather simplistic since it fails to comprehend the complex-
ity of Belarusian domestic nation building process. Professor V. Rakutis from Lithua-
nia, however, claimed that Belarusian textbooks are rewriting Lithuanian past and might 
even contest Lithuanian present heritage. After the analysis of Belarusian nation-
building and development of the Belarusian national narrative, it appears that Belarus 
has no intentions to rewrite the Lithuanian past since the official national narrative pre-
sented in textbooks is a direct reflection of complicated process of the making of Bela-
rusian identity. Before 2002 the Belarusian official national narrative did not contest 
Lithuanian past on the same level it contests today because the broader recognition of 
the pre-Soviet and pre-imperial past came only after 2002. Therefore, the modern pro-
cess of nation building is a reflection of complicated domestic process of understanding 
of Belarusian communality that nowadays seems recognizing aspects of pro-soviet and 
pro-European narratives. 
The Master’s thesis Belarus’s National Narratives and Representation of the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania in Belarus’s History Textbooks concludes that the official 
Belarusian national narrative in Belarusian history textbooks does not tend to “rewrite” 
the Lithuanian past, however, it definitely challenges the Lithuanian interpretation of 
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the shared medieval past of Belarus and Lithuania. A more comprehensive research in-
volving a broader perspective and the larger choice of history textbooks, however, is 
needed to fully master the exact impact the official Belarusian national narrative has on 
the Lithuanian national narrative. In doing so, an analysis of Lithuanian history text-
books is vital. 
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